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PROTECT DOWNWARD DEPARTURES: 
CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE’S 
INTRUSION INTO JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
Skye Phillips* 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the 
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. 
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should 
be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is 
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls 
on government would be necessary.1 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 9, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of Jorge Santiago 
who had pled guilty in district court to criminal possession of a 
firearm.2 In addition, the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A., Vassar College, 1996. The 
author would like to thank her parents and the Journal of Law and Policy staff 
for their help and encouragement. 
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 268-69 (James Madison) (George W. Carey 
& James McClellan eds., 2001). 
2 U.S. v. Santiago, No. 02-1217, 2003 WL 22318785, at *1 (2d. Cir. 2003). 
The statute prohibits any person convicted of a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from possessing a firearm. See 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2004). Under usual circumstances, the maximum penalty for 
Santiago’s crime would be ten years’ imprisonment. Id. at *3. Santiago had been 
convicted of two felony assault offenses and a drug trafficking offense, 
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court’s denial of Santiago’s request, based on his unique family 
circumstances, for a downward departure, a process by which 
judges may adjust a criminal sentence based on aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances.3 
While Santiago’s case presents nothing out of the ordinary, his 
request for a downward departure prompted a lively discussion 
between the assistant U.S. attorney for the District of Connecticut 
and the three judge panel hearing his appeal, which contained 
Judges Guido Calabresi, Roger J. Miner, and Chester J. Straub.4 
Judge Calabresi told the assistant U.S. attorney, “You’re telling 
me . . . that the system we have set up, that has been set up by 
Congress, which removes discretion from the judges, has given 
discretion to your office, as a practical matter.”5 He continued, 
“[This] is a fundamental objection to that system, that it takes 
discretion from independent courts and gives it to dependent 
prosecutors, who then have to answer to the attorney general and 
other political figures. But that’s the system and it’s been held 
constitutional, and here we are.”6 The assistant U.S. attorney 
responded by telling Judge Calabresi that Santiago had accepted a 
plea bargain based on the advice of his own attorney, but Judge 
Miner interjected by saying “[i]f we go along with your adversary, 
you’ll probably take our names and report them to the attorney 
general.”7 Judge Straub immediately said, “Be sure you spell them 
correctly. Especially Straub. S-T-R-A-U-B.”8 
The three judge panel’s comments were in response to the 
April 30, 2003 enactment, of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other 
                                                          
however, when he was sixteen and seventeen years old. Id. at *1-2. As a result, 
the district court sentenced him to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years. 
Id. 
3 Id. at 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2004). 
4 Tom Perrotta, Panel Laments Lack of Judicial Discretion, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 
28, 2003, at 1. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the current 
sentencing system in United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). See infra 
Part II.B. 
7 Perrotta, supra note 4, at 1. 
8 Id. 
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Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT 
Act).9 The purpose of the PROTECT Act is to comprehensively 
strengthen “law enforcement’s ability to prevent, investigate, 
prosecute and punish violent crimes committed against children.”10 
The PROTECT Act contains a number of provisions, however, 
which are not limited to the protection of children and threaten to 
reduce the input of the judiciary in the uniquely judicial area of 
criminal sentencing.11 It includes a controversial amendment 
authored by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and sponsored by 
Representative Tom Feeney.12 The Feeney Amendment, as Judges 
Calabresi, Miner, and Straub noted, threatens to curb judicial 
discretion in criminal sentencing and may intimidate individual 
judges in the performance of their traditional duties.13 For 
approximately the past two decades pursuant to Congress’ mandate 
to the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission), judges 
have possessed the power to adjust criminal sentences in certain 
circumstances to prevent unjust punishment.14 However, the 
                                                          
9 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-2, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in 
scattered sections of 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
10 Office of Public Affairs Press Releases, Dep’t of Justice, 04-30-03 FACT 
SHEET PROTECT ACT (April, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/. 
11 Recent Legislation–Congress Amends the Sentencing Guidelines in an 
Attempt to Reduce Disparities, 117 HARV. L. REV. 751, 753-54 (2003) 
(discussing the impact of the PROTECT Act on criminal sentencing). The 
PROTECT Act, among other things, limits the composition of the Sentencing 
Commission to “not more than three” federal judges. PROTECT Act § 
401(n)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004). It changes the abuse of discretion standard 
of appellate review to a de novo standard. PROTECT Act § 401(d)(2), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(e) (2004). It also imposes new data collection provisions and reporting 
requirements. PROTECT Act § 401(h), 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2004). 
12 Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Ashcroft Intensifies Campaign against 
Soft Sentences by Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A1. 
13 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the 
Federal Judges Association Board of Directors meeting (May 5, 2003), at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-05-03.html. Chief 
Justice William H. Rehnquist noted that the Feeney Amendment “could appear 
to be an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges in 
the performance of their judicial duties.” Id. 
14 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
(2003). “The sentencing judge must select a sentence from within the guideline 
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PROTECT Act threatens to rein in this check on excessive 
criminal sentences and disrupt the balance of power in sentencing 
between the three branches of government.15 
This note argues that judicial discretion is a key component of 
a just sentencing scheme and deserves protection from the current 
attack by the Executive and Congress. Part I of this note describes 
the historical background of judicial discretion in sentencing and 
the emergence of sentencing disparity which ultimate led to 
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).16 Part II 
of this note describes the statutory purposes of the Sentencing 
Commission and the form and content of judicial discretion under 
the Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) promulgated by the 
Commission.17 Additionally, this part describes the Supreme 
                                                          
range. If, however, a particular case presents atypical features, the Act allows 
the judge to depart from the guidelines and sentence outside the range.” Id. 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) noted that “[a]s enacted, the Feeney Amendment, 
substantially reversed provisions allowing Federal judges to depart from 
sentencing guidelines when justice requires.” 149 CONG. REC. S9115-02, 9115 
(daily ed. July 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
15 149 CONG. REC. S9115-02, 9115 (daily ed. July 9, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy stated that the Feeney Amendment “effectively 
overturned the basic structure of the carefully crafted sentencing guideline 
system . . . . Not only have we compromised the sentencing system, but we have 
alienated and minimized the effectiveness of our Federal judges . . . .” Id. 
16 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
17 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
(2003). 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 changed the course of federal 
sentencing. Among other things, the Act created the United States 
Sentencing Commission as an independent agency in the Judicial 
Branch, and directed it to develop guidelines and policy statements for 
sentencing courts to use when sentencing offenders convicted of federal 
crimes. Moreover, it empowered the Commission with ongoing 
responsibilities to monitor the guidelines, submit to Congress 
appropriate modifications of the guidelines and recommended changes 
in criminal statutes, and establish education and research programs. The 
mandate rested on Congressional awareness that sentencing was a 
dynamic field that requires continuing review by an expert body to 
revise sentencing policies, in light of application experience, as new 
criminal statutes are enacted, and as more is learned about what 
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Court’s involvement in the Guidelines and the transfer of 
discretionary power to federal prosecutors resulting from 
provisions of the Guidelines. Part III describes the legislative 
history of AMBER Alert and the Feeney Amendment and argues 
that Representative Feeney and the DOJ used AMBER Alert to 
push through Congress their limitation on judicial discretion. This 
part also argues that disparity in criminal sentencing is partly 
attributable to the DOJ. Part IV argues that the Feeney 
Amendment’s reduction of judicial discretion in sentencing raises 
constitutional and fairness issues. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Judicial discretion in sentencing has experienced several 
historical shifts in accordance with the prevailing philosophy of 
punishment.18 There are two general philosophies of punishment: 
retribution or “just desert,” and utilitarianism.19 Utilitarianism 
encompasses several models of crime control, including 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.20 Retributivism 
                                                          
motivates and controls criminal behavior. 
Id. 
18 Paul W. Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 528, 529-30 (1958) (discussing the historical evolution of 
sentencing and parole practices). One commentator noted that “[e]xperience has 
shown that the ascendancy of any one of these [philosophies of punishment] 
generally rests primarily on shifts in the political climate, not on some abstract 
assessment of a given goal’s intrinsic value.” Developments in the Law–
Alternative Punishments: Resistance and Inroads, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1967, 
1969 (1998) (discussing the way in which punishment is discussed in the United 
States). 
19 Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: 
Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 19, 85 n.6 (2003) (discussing the philosophical approach of the 
federal sentencing guidelines). 
20 Id. Criminal law textbooks have also treated deterrence, retribution, 
rehabilitation, and incapacitation as distinct models of punishment. 
Developments in the Law–Alternative Punishments: Resistance and Inroads, 
supra note 18, at 1969. The deterrent model views man as a “pleasure-seeking, 
pain-avoiding creature” and states that the “objective [of punishment] is to deal 
with the criminal in such a way as to serve notice on potential offenders. To this 
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suggests that punishment is a positive moral duty and does not rely 
upon societal benefits.21 In essence, retributivism justifies 
punishment because an offender deserves it and should suffer in 
proportion to the offense or wrongdoing; it does not rely on the 
positive consequences to society stemming from punishment.22 On 
the other hand, utilitarianism focuses on the functions of 
punishment with regard to the total maximization of benefits to the 
community.23 Thus, the rehabilitative approach focuses on the 
“individualization of punishment and working with the individual 
in such a way that he will be able to make a satisfactory 
adjustment, or at least a non-criminal adjustment, once he is 
released from the authority of the state.”24 Judicial discretion 
evolved into its most expansive form under the rehabilitative 
                                                          
end the focus is on the assignment of that appropriate penalty, no more, no less, 
which will deter potential offenders from committing crimes.” THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT 6-7 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971). The incapacitation based system 
“implicitly gives up on rehabilitative possibilities and on the possibilities of 
deterring the specific criminals to which it is applied. It prevents crime in only 
one way: by preventing the specific criminal from committing crimes during the 
duration of his sentence.” Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of 
Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 464 (1997) (discussing models of crime control). 
21 Andrew R. Strauss, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forest for the 
Retributivist Trees: An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian 
Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1558 (2002) (discussing the 
various models of punishment). 
22 Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 859-60 (2002) (discussing the retributive 
theory of punishment). The retributivist “defends the desirability of a punitive 
response to the criminal by saying that the punitive reaction is the pain the 
criminal deserves, and that it is highly desirable to provide for an orderly, 
collective expression of society’s natural feeling of revulsion toward and 
disapproval of criminal acts.” THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 5. 
23 Strauss, supra note 21, at 1556-57. In describing the utilitarian theory of 
punishment, Jeremy Bentham, an English philosopher and social reformer, 
wrote that “[t]he general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in 
common, is to augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in 
the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, every thing that tends to subtract 
from that happiness: in other words to exclude mischief.” THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1996). 
24 THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 8. 
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model, which emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century.25 
A. Judicial Discretion Prior to the Sentencing Guidelines 
Prior to this period, however, judicial discretion had a less 
significant position in sentencing.26 From the War of Independence 
until the 1870s, retribution was the primary purpose of 
incarceration.27 Discretion over criminal sentencing resided largely 
with the legislature.28 In the early 1800s judges began to receive 
increased discretion but were still required to sentence within a 
prescribed range of punishment.29 The Supreme Court noted that 
during this period “‘the excessive rigidity of the [mandatory or 
fixed sentence] system’ soon gave way in some jurisdictions . . . to 
a scheme permitting the sentencing judge . . . to consider 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding an offense, 
and, on that basis, to select a sentence within a range defined by 
the legislature.”30 Thus, while Congress established the sentence 
                                                          
25 Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 883, 894 (1990) 
(discussing the historical shifts in sentencing goals). 
26 Id. at 892-93. 
27 Id. at 893. 
28 Id. at 892. Chief Justice Burger noted that “[i]n the early days of the 
Republic, when imprisonment had only recently emerged as an alternative to the 
death penalty, confinement in public stocks, or whipping in the town square, the 
period of incarceration was generally prescribed with specificity by the 
legislature.” United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978). The assertion 
that the legislature had control over criminal sentencing, however, may be open 
to debate. Two commentators have noted that proponents of mandatory 
sentencing guidelines are disinclined to acknowledge that federal judges have 
been entrusted with broad sentencing discretion since the beginning of the 
Republic. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 & 197 n.1 (1998). For example, 
Congress enacted a criminal statute in 1789 which prescribed that upon 
conviction for bribery of a customs official, the defendant “shall . . . be punished 
by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court . . ., so as the fine 
shall not exceed one thousand dollars, and the term of imprisonment shall not 
exceed twelve months.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
29 Nagel, supra note 25, at 892. 
30 Grayson, 438 U.S. at 45-46 (quoting Paul W. Tappan, Sentencing Under 
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for federal crimes and controlled the scope of judicial discretion, 
the fixed penalty structure gave way to increased judicial 
discretion.31 
In the 1870s, the rehabilitative model of punishment began to 
take hold.32 The rehabilitative model would fundamentally reshape 
criminal sentencing for approximately the next one hundred 
years.33 This model incorporated the idea that “[t]he supreme aim 
of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals and not the 
infliction of vindictive suffering.”34 The Supreme Court observed 
in 1949 that “[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of 
the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have 
become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”35 In 
conjunction with the adoption of the rehabilitative model was the 
                                                          
the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 528, 529 (1958) (discussing 
the historical evolution of sentencing and parole practices)). In addition, the 
Court explained that “[n]evertheless, the focus remained on the crime: Each 
particular offense was to be punished in proportion to the social harm caused by 
it and according to the offender’s culpability. The purpose of incarceration 
remained, primarily, retribution and punishment.” Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46 
(citations omitted). 
31 Nagel, supra note 25, at 893. 
32 Id. 
33 Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46. The Supreme Court noted: 
Approximately a century ago, a reform movement asserting that the 
purpose of incarceration, and therefore the guiding consideration in 
sentencing, should be rehabilitation of the offender, dramatically 
altered the approach to sentencing. A fundamental proposal of this 
movement was a flexible sentencing system permitting judges and 
correctional personnel, particularly the latter, to set the release date of 
prisoners according to informed judgments concerning their potential 
for, or actual, rehabilitation and their likely recidivism. Indeed, the 
most extreme formulations of the emerging rehabilitation model, with 
its “reformatory sentence,” posited that “convicts [regardless of the 
nature of their crime] can never be rightfully imprisoned except upon 
proof that it is unsafe for themselves and for society to leave them free, 
and when confined can never be rightfully released until they show 
themselves fit for membership in a free community.” 
Id. at 46. 
34 Nagel, supra note 25, at 893. 
35 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). 
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development of indeterminate sentencing, which embodied the 
notion that a prisoner should be imprisoned until he had 
reformed.36 Judges exercised very broad discretion under this 
model as the legislature delegated more sentencing responsibility 
to the judiciary.37 Although statutes specified the penalties for 
crimes, the sentencing judge had wide discretion to decide whether 
the offender should be incarcerated, the length of incarceration, or 
whether probation or a fine should be imposed.38 
Judges were not alone in exercising broad discretion within the 
context of indeterminate sentencing.39 In 1910, Congress created 
the United States Parole Board, located within the Executive 
Branch, to determine the actual release date of federal prisoners.40 
Reflecting the rise of progressive beliefs with regard to criminal 
sentencing, parole officers determined when prisoners were 
                                                          
36 Nagel, supra note 25, at 893-94. 
37 Id. 
38 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). 
39 United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978). Indeterminate 
sentencing involved “a flexible system permitting judges and correctional 
personnel, particularly the latter, to set the release date of prisoners according to 
informed judgments concerning their potential for, or actual, rehabilitation and 
their likely recidivism.” Id. Indeterminate sentencing involved the delegation of 
authority to parole boards. Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the 
Criminal History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal 
Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 112 (2003) (discussing the emergence of 
parole in the twentieth century). The Supreme Court has noted that both 
indeterminate sentencing and parole were “based on concepts of the offender’s 
possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to attempt to 
rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume 
criminal activity upon his return to society.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. The 
system of indeterminate sentencing “required the judge and the parole officer to 
make their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own 
assessments of the offender’s amenability to rehabilitation.” Id. at 363. 
40 William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. 
VA. L. REV. 373, 378 (1995) (discussing twentieth-century federal indeterminate 
sentencing). See An Act to Parole United States Prisoners, ch. 387, §§ 2-10, 36 
Stat. 819 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202-4208 (2000)) 
(repealed 1984). 
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rehabilitated and could reenter society.41 Prisoners had to serve at 
least one third of the nominal sentence, however, unless the judge 
at the time of sentencing determined the offender was immediately 
eligible for parole.42 Parole officers were viewed as experts who 
would be able to make release decisions without succumbing to the 
“politics of legislatures” or “the emotions of courtrooms.”43 
Implicit to both systems was the ideal of individualized 
sentencing.44 Thus, the judge and the parole officer exercised 
broad discretion under this system.45 
B. Sentencing Disparity and the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 
For over one hundred years prior to the adoption of the 
Sentencing Reform Act, this system was in place.46 In the latter 
half of the twentieth century, a growing discontent with this system 
emerged.47 Beginning in the late 1960s, reform of the criminal 
sentencing system became a priority.48 A major reason for the 
                                                          
41 Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing As Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 311, 326 (2003) (discussing the professionalization of the law of 
punishment). 
42 See An Act to Parole United States Prisoners, ch. 387, §§ 2-10, 36 Stat. 
819 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202-4208 (2000)) (repealed 
1984). 
43 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 21. 
44 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247. Justice Black explained in 1949 that the 
“prevalent modern philosophy of penology [is] that the punishment should fit 
the offender and not merely the crime. The belief no longer prevails that every 
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard 
to the past life and habits of a particular offender.” Id. 
45 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. 
46 Nagel, supra note 25, at 894. 
47 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983). 
48 Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress 
and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 
294-95 (1993) (discussing the background of reform leading to the enactment of 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). Prior to this point, reform efforts focused 
on revision of the substantive criminal law and criminal procedure. STITH & 
CABRANES, supra note 28, at 27-29. The American Law Institute reformed the 
substantive criminal law when it drafted the Model Penal Code in 1962. Id. at 
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discontent with the rehabilitative model was its subjectivity, in that 
it led to widespread sentencing disparity.49 One problem was the 
difficulty in determining whether or when a prisoner was 
rehabilitated.50 Another was that individual judges, absent statutory 
guidance, applied their own notions of the purposes of 
sentencing.51 Sentencing disparity, Congress recognized, 
contradicts notions of fairness and certainty.52 For example, as of 
1983, “the average federal sentence for bank robbery was eleven 
years, but in the northern district of Illinois it was only five and 
one-half years.”53 Congress deemed that parole officers and judges 
                                                          
29. During the 1960s, the Supreme Court implemented a variety of new 
procedural restraints. Id. at 27 & 205 n.111. In addition, Congress established 
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (the “Brown 
Commission”) to propose a revision of federal criminal provisions. Feinberg, 
supra, at 294. One commentator noted that “by proposing consistent, rational, 
and fair classification of crimes, both efforts [the Model Penal Code and the 
Brown Commission] paved the way for bolder, more comprehensive, sentencing 
reform.” Id. 
49 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983). Congress explained: 
One offender may receive a sentence of probation, while another— 
convicted of the very same crime and possessing a comparable criminal 
history—may be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment. Even 
two such offenders who are sentenced to terms of imprisonment for 
similar offenses may receive widely differing prison release dates; one 
may be sentenced to a relatively short term and be released after 
serving most of the sentence, while the other may be sentenced to a 
relatively long term but be denied parole indefinitely. 
Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41 (1983). A study was performed for the 
Department of Justice in which: 
208 active federal judges specified the sentences they would impose in 
16 hypothetical cases, 8 bank robbery cases, and 8 fraud cases. In only 
3 of the 16 cases was there a unanimous agreement to impose a prison 
term. Even where most judges agreed that a prison term was 
appropriate, there was a substantial variation in the lengths of prison 
terms recommended. In one fraud case in which the mean prison term 
was 8.5 years, the longest term was life in prison. In another case the 
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were responsible for sentencing disparity.54 
The widespread sentencing disparity stemming from discretion 
in the criminal system led to increasing criticism from academic 
circles and the political left during this period.55 The most 
powerful voice for reform of judicial sentencing discretion came 
from Judge Marvin E. Frankel, who served as a United States 
District Judge in New York City.56 Judge Frankel wrote a book 
describing the unchecked sentencing authority of judges as 
“terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to 
rule of law” and professed the view that “arbitrary cruelties [were] 
perpetrated daily.”57 He called for the creation of an administrative 
                                                          
mean prison term was 1.1 years, yet the longest prison term 
recommended was 15 years. 
Id. at 44 (footnote omitted). 
54 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983). The Senate Report observed: 
These disparities, whether they occur at the time of the initial 
sentencing or at the parole stage, can be traced directly to the unfettered 
discretion the law confers on those judges and parole authorities 
responsible for imposing and implementing the sentence. This 
sweeping discretion flows from the lack of any statutory guidance or 
review procedures to which courts and parole boards might look. 
Id. The SRA abolished parole. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. 
A, introductory cmt. (2003). The introduction to the Guidelines noted that “[t]he 
Act requires the offender to serve virtually all of any prison sentence imposed, 
for it abolishes parole and substantially restructures good behavior adjustments.” 
Id. 
55 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 33-34. For example, Professor 
Kenneth Culp Davis of the University of Chicago Law School examined the 
discretionary authority of a wide variety of actors in the criminal sentencing 
scheme, including police, prosecutors, judges, and parole officials. Id. at 33. See 
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY. The 
American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organization devoted to service, 
development, social justice, and peace programs throughout the world, called for 
limits on judicial discretion and adoption of determinate sentencing. STITH & 
CABRANES, supra note 28, at 34. See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE 
FOR JUSTICE. A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, PREPARED 
FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE (1971). 
56  STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 35. 
57 Id. at 35-36 (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW 
WITHOUT ORDER). 
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sentencing commission with the purpose of creating “binding 
guides” on federal courts.58 Judge Frankel’s reform proposals were 
taken up by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a Democrat from 
Massachusetts.59 
In 1975, Senator Kennedy introduced legislation to establish a 
Federal Sentencing Commission with the mandate of creating 
sentencing guidelines to redress sentencing disparity.60 It was not 
until nine years later that President Ronald Reagan signed the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.61 The passage of the Sentencing 
Reform Act occurred in conjunction with a growing public fear of 
crime and a determination by Congress and President Reagan to 
“crack down” on criminals.62 The passage of the Sentencing 
Reform Act made explicitly clear “the rejection of the 
rehabilitative model and goals upon which past sentencing 
decisions had been made, in favor of the new bases for sentencing 
–to punish, to promote respect for the law, to deter, and to 
incapacitate.”63 Thus, the rehabilitative model began its descent 
from its position as the philosophical underpinning of criminal 
sentencing.64 
                                                          
58 Id. at 36. A “detailed chart or calculus [would] be used . . . in weighing 
the many elements that go into a sentence . . . that would include, wherever 
possible, some form of numerical or other objective grading.” Id. 
59 Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The 
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 223, 223 (1993) (discussing the legislative history of the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984). 
60 Id. at 224-25. 
61 Id. (analyzing the legislative history and political compromises which 
ultimately led to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). See also 
Feinberg, supra note 48, at 298-304. Beginning in 1975, Senator Kennedy 
introduced versions of his reform bill in the next four Congresses before it was 
passed in 1984. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 38 & 208 n.4. 
62 See Stith & Koh, supra note 59, at 258-59, 262. 
63 Nagel, supra note 25, at 928. 
64 Developments in the Law–Alternative Punishments: Resistance and 
Inroads, supra note 18, at 1969. It has been noted that “[w]hether because of a 
failure in implementation or a deeper psychological shift in attitude towards 
criminals in the wake of rising crime rates, the rehabilitative model went into 
decline in the mid-1970s.” Id. 
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II.  JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
The creation of the new sentencing scheme begged the 
question of what role judicial discretion would play under the 
Guidelines. When it enacted the SRA, the main intent of Congress 
with regard to judicial discretion was to ensure that judges had a 
structure within which to operate while not abrogating their ability 
to depart downward in appropriate cases: “The purpose of the 
sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the 
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual 
offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of 
individualized sentences.”65 The Supreme Court has also 
emphasized the uniquely valuable role of the Judicial Branch in 
criminal sentencing.66 Perhaps one of the unintended consequences 
of the Guidelines, however, is to increase the prosecutorial 
discretion in the criminal sentencing system. 
A. Congress Creates the United States Sentencing 
Commission 
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission 
under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.67 It established the 
Commission “as an independent commission” located in the 
Judicial Branch.68 The President appoints the Commission’s seven 
voting members by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.69 At the time of its creation, the Commission was 
composed of “at least three” federal judges recommended to the 
President by the Judicial Conference of the United States.70 The 
                                                          
65 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 (1983). 
66 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (explaining that 
judicial contribution to sentencing is appropriate because of the “experience and 
expertise” of that branch). 
67 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
68 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004). 
69 Id. 
70 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1984). Under the provisions of the PROTECT Act, 
the composition of the Sentencing Commission is now limited to “not more than 
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SRA transferred much of the sentencing authority previously 
exercised by the judiciary to the Sentencing Commission.71 Even 
though Congress delegated broad authority to the Commission to 
create the Sentencing Guidelines, it provided detailed instructions 
with regard to the rationalization of the sentencing process.72 
Congress authorized the Sentencing Commission to establish 
sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice 
system.73 The SRA established that the purposes of the sentence 
imposed were to (1) reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 
offense; (2) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) 
to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) 
to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner.74 These purposes respectively are retribution, 
                                                          
three” federal judges. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-2, § 401(n)(1), 117 Stat. 
650 (2003) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)). 
71 Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 380. 
72 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
(2003). 
73 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2001). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
states: 
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to—(1) 
establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal 
justice system that—(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of 
sentencing as set forth in [the Act]; (B) provide certainty and fairness in 
meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient 
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by 
mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the 
establishment of general sentencing practices; and (C) reflect, to the 
extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it 
relates to the criminal justice process; and (2) develop means of 
measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional 
practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth 
in [the Act]. 
Id. 
74 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2004). 
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deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.75 The SRA required 
judges to consider these purposes of sentencing when imposing a 
sentence.76 In particular, Congress instructed the Sentencing 
Commission to create categories of offense behavior and offender 
characteristics.77 For example, an offense behavior category might 
consist of “bank robbery/committed with a gun/$2500 taken,” and 
an offender characteristic category might be an “offender with one 
prior conviction not resulting in imprisonment.”78 Congress 
required the Commission to prescribe guidelines ranges that 
specify an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons 
determined by coordinating the offense behavior categories with 
the offender characteristic categories.79 
In addition, Congress instructed the Commission as to the form 
and content of judicial discretion under the Guidelines.80 The SRA 
provides that a court must impose a sentence within the applicable 
guideline range unless “the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
                                                          
75 Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, The 
False Trail Of Uniformity And Process, And The Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L. 
REV. 649, 654 (2003) (describing the goals of criminal sentencing). 
76 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). 
77 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
(2003). The background commentary to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines notes 
that the Act “delegates to the Commission broad authority to review and 
rationalize the federal sentencing process. The statute contains many detailed 
instructions as to how this determination should be made, but the most important 
of them instructs the Commission to create categories of offense behavior and 
offender characteristics.” Id. See the editorial note of U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2003) for the original text 
of the introduction to the Sentencing Guidelines, which this section cites. 
78 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. The introduction to the Sentencing Guidelines noted that “[p]ursuant 
to the Act, the sentencing court must select a sentence from within the guideline 
range. If, however, a particular case presents atypical features, the Act allows 
the court to depart from the guidelines and sentence outside the prescribed 
range. In that case, the court must specify reasons for departure.” Id. 
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sentence different from that prescribed.”81 Pursuant to this 
approach, the introduction to the Sentencing Guidelines notes that 
the Sentencing Commission “intends the sentencing courts to treat 
each guideline as carving out a ‘heartland,’ a set of typical cases 
embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.”82 If a case 
falls outside the “heartland” of the applicable guidelines, the court 
possesses the power to grant an upward or downward departure.83 
The Sentencing Commission provided guidance to courts with 
regard to the departure power by listing encouraged and 
discouraged bases for departure.84 The Commission noted, 
however, that it would be impossible to predict in advance all of 
the bases for downward departures.85 Thus, the Guidelines provide 
courts with residual authority to depart downward in appropriate 
circumstances.86 
Congress considered several different sentencing models to 
                                                          
81 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2003). 
82 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
(2002). 
83 Id. The Sentencing Guidelines note that “[w]hen a court finds an atypical 
case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct 
significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure 
is warranted.” Id. 
84 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996). For example, “[i]f the 
victim’s wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense 
behavior, the court may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect 
the nature and circumstances of the offense.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2003). The Guidelines list several factors that the court 
cannot take into account as grounds for departure. U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2002). For example, 
grounds that are not relevant in the determination of a sentence are race, sex, 
national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status. U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2003). 
85 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2002). “Circumstances 
that may warrant departure from the guideline range pursuant to this provision 
cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance. 
The decision as to whether and to what extent departure is warranted rests with 
the sentencing court on a case-specific basis.” Id. 
86 Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT. R. 310 
(Vera Inst. Just.) (June 2003), at 2003 WL 22208841. 
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guide the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines.87 
At one end of the spectrum, Congress considered making the 
sentencing guidelines advisory only.88 At the other end, Congress 
considered a strict determinate sentencing model that would 
virtually remove judicial discretion.89 Ultimately, Congress 
directed the Sentencing Commission to adopt a “mandatory 
guideline system” because it would be “successful in reducing 
sentence disparities while retaining the flexibility needed to adjust 
for unanticipated factors arising in a particular case.”90 Even 
though the creation of federal sentencing guidelines reduced 
judicial discretion, Congress continued to view such discretion as a 
fundamental component of a viable sentencing scheme.91 
B. The Supreme Court and the Sentencing Guidelines 
In 1989, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
SRA in Mistretta v. United States.92 The petitioner, who was 
convicted of selling cocaine, argued that Congress granted the 
Commission excessive legislative discretion violating the 
constitutional non-delegation doctrine and that the composition 
and location of the Commission violated separation of powers 
principles.93 The Court upheld the SRA’s delegation of authority to 
the Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing policy because 
the SRA set forth sufficient policies and standards to guide the 
Commission’s formulation of the Guidelines.94 
                                                          
87 United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51 (1983). “The sentencing guidelines system will 
not remove all of the judge’s sentencing discretion. Instead, it will guide the 
judge in making his decision on the appropriate sentence.” Id. 
92 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410 (1989). Petitioner and 
another were indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Missouri on three counts in a cocaine sale. Id. at 370. 
93 Id. at 370. 
94 Id. at 379. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2001) for the SRA text delegating 
authority to the Commission. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-79 for the Court’s 
entire analysis of Mistretta’s delegation argument. 
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The Court then turned to Mistretta’s separation of powers 
argument.95 The Court began its analysis by affirming that the 
principle of separated powers is essential to the maintenance of 
governmental structure.96 The Court observed that the system of 
checked power, contained within the separation of powers 
principle, provides security against the tendency of each of the 
separate Branches to aggrandize power at the expense of the 
others.97 The practical application is that “provisions of law that 
either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately 
diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority 
and independence of one or another coordinate Branch,” violate 
separation of powers principles.98 The Court observed that 
Congress’ creation of the Sentencing Commission was 
constitutional provided that Congress had not vested powers in the 
Commission that are “more appropriately performed by the other 
Branches” or “that undermine the integrity of the Judiciary.”99 
The petitioner argued that the SRA violated both of these 
constitutional principles because the SRA required individual 
                                                          
95 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380.  
96 Id. at 380. The Court wrote that it has “consistently given voice to, and 
has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, 
within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three 
coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.” Id. The Court 
further noted that the “Framers did not require—and indeed rejected—the notion 
that the three Branches must be entirely separate and distinct.” Id. Indeed, James 
Madison defended the position of the Framers that the three Branches should not 
be hermetically sealed by observing that separation of powers “d[oes] not mean 
that these [three] departments have no partial agency in, or no controul over the 
acts of each other,” but rather “that where the whole power of one department is 
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another 
department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 251 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
97 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381-82. The Court observed that “this concern of 
encroachment and aggrandizement . . . has animated our separation-of-powers 
jurisprudence and aroused our vigilance against the ‘hydraulic pressure inherent 
within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power.’” 
Id. at 382 (citations omitted). 
98 Id. at 382. 
99 Id. at 385. 
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Article III judges to exercise legislative authority through the 
creation of sentencing rules and eroded the integrity and 
independence of the Judiciary by requiring Article III judges to sit 
on the Commission.100 With regard to Mistretta’s first argument, 
the Court held that there was no per se rule against judicial 
rulemaking.101 Congress may delegate nonadjudicatory functions 
to the Judicial Branch that do not encroach upon the powers of 
another Branch and comport to the central mission of the 
Judiciary.102 Indeed, the Court suggested that the rulemaking duties 
of the Sentencing Commission were particularly appropriate for 
the Judicial Branch.103 The Court likened the role of the 
                                                          
100 Id. at 383-84. With regard to the first claim, Petitioner specifically 
argued that the SRA unconstitutionally required the Judicial Branch to exercise 
not only judicial authority but legislative authority in the creation of sentencing 
policy. Id. at 383. Petitioner argued that “rulemaking authority” may be 
exercised by Congress or delegated by Congress to the Executive, but may not 
be delegated or exercised by the Judicial Branch. Id. Petitioner’s second claim 
specifically argued that Congress threatened the independence of the Judiciary 
by requiring that the judges on the Commission share their authority with non-
judges and by giving the President appointment and removal power over the 
Commission’s members. Id. at 384. Petitioner argued further that “Congress, 
consistent with the separation of powers, may not upset the balance among the 
Branches by co-opting federal judges into the quintessentially political work of 
establishing sentencing guidelines, by subjecting those judges to the political 
whims of the Chief Executive, and by forcing judges to share their power with 
nonjudges.” Id. at 384. 
101 Id. at 386. The Court noted that “we specifically have held that 
Congress, in some circumstances, may confer rulemaking authority on the 
Judicial Branch.” Id. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) (in 
which the Court declared that Congress has power to “regulate the practice and 
procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or 
other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or 
Constitution of the United States”). 
102 Id. at 388. The Court noted that, by established practice, it had 
recognized Congress’ power to create entities, such as the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, comprised of judges and non-judges, which do not exercise 
judicial power in the constitutional sense of deciding cases and controversies, 
but share the common purpose of providing for the fulfillment of responsibilities 
that are properly the province of the Judiciary. Id. at 388-89. 
103 Id. at 380-90. The Court stated: 
Thus, although the judicial power of the United States is limited by 
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Commission in promulgating the Guidelines to the accepted role of 
the Supreme Court in establishing rules of civil and criminal 
procedure under various enabling Acts.104 Thus, the Court upheld 
the location of the Commission in the Judicial Branch.105 
The Court also upheld the composition of the Sentencing 
Commission.106 The Court determined that the SRA did not 
undermine the integrity of the Judicial Branch by mandating that 
the Commission contain “at least three” federal judges because the 
SRA does not conscript judges to serve on the Commission107 and 
the Constitution does not prevent Article III judges from 
participating in certain extrajudicial activities such as serving on 
                                                          
express provision of Article III to “Cases” and “Controversies,” we 
have never held, and have clearly disavowed in practice, that the 
Constitution prohibits Congress from assigning to courts or auxiliary 
bodies within the Judicial Branch administrative or rulemaking duties 
that, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, are “necessary and 
proper . . . for carrying into execution all the judgments which the 
judicial department has power to pronounce.” Because of their close 
relation to the central mission of the Judicial Branch, such extrajudicial 
activities are consonant with the integrity of the Branch and are not 
more appropriate for another Branch. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
104 Id. at 391. The Court noted: “Such guidelines, like the Federal Rules of 
Criminal and Civil Procedure, are court rules—rules, to paraphrase Chief Justice 
Marshall’s language in Wayman, for carrying into execution judgments that the 
Judiciary has the power to pronounce.” Id. Petitioner argued in response that the 
analogy between the Guidelines and the rules of procedure is flawed because 
creating sentencing policy is substantive in nature. Id. at 392. The Court 
responded that separation of powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an 
activity but rather on the “unique aspects of the congressional plan at issue and 
its practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article 
III.” Id. at 393. First, the Court explained that because Congress vested the 
power to create sentencing guidelines in an independent agency, rather than a 
court, Congress did not combine legislative and judicial power within the 
Judicial Branch. Id. at 394. Second, locating the Sentencing Commission in the 
Judicial Branch did not inappropriately accumulate power in that Branch 
because prior to the passage of the Act, the Judicial Branch “decided precisely 
the questions assigned to the Commission.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 395. 
105  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 395. 
106 Id. at 397-412. 
107 Id. at 405-06. 
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the Commission.108 The Court affirmed that the Judiciary’s 
involvement in the “political work” of the Commission would not 
undermine public confidence in the disinterestedness of the 
Judicial Branch because “[j]udicial contribution to the enterprise of 
creating rules to limit the discretion of sentencing judges does not 
enlist the resources or reputation of the Judicial Branch in either 
the legislative business of determining what conduct should be 
criminalized or the executive business of enforcing the law.”109 
Indeed, the Court affirmed the importance of having a “significant 
judicial voice” on the Commission.110 Finally, the Court held that 
the President’s removal power does not threaten judicial 
independence because a federal judge, absent impeachment, would 
continue to have tenure under the “good behavior” provision of the 
Constitution.111 Thus, the Supreme Court held that Congress 
neither unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the 
Sentencing Commission nor violated the separation of powers 
doctrine.112 
Issues surrounding the SRA reached the Court again in Koon v. 
United States.113 The Supreme Court explicitly approved the 
“heartland” approach contained in the Sentencing Guidelines and 
the ability of judges to depart on non-specified grounds.114 Koon 
concerned the prosecution of the Los Angeles Police Department 
officers who were sentenced to thirty months imprisonment for 
beating Rodney King.115 The officers appealed their convictions 
                                                          
108 Id. at 404. 
109 Id. at 407. 
110 Id. at 408. 
111 Id. at 410. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1. 
112 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
113 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
114 Vinegrad, supra note 86. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83 
(discussing the “heartland” approach). 
115 Koon, 518 U.S. at 86-90. The District Court departed downward eight 
levels. Id. at 85. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the District 
Court’s rulings, and, over the published objection of nine of its judges, declined 
to rehear the case en banc. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine the appropriate standards of appellate review of a district court’s 
decision to depart from the Guidelines. Id. 
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and the Government appealed the sentences.116 The Court observed 
that district judges must impose a sentence within the guideline 
range if the case is an “ordinary” one.117 While directing 
sentencing courts to bear in mind the Commission’s expectations 
that departures on non-specified grounds will be “highly 
infrequent,” the Court affirmed the ability of judges to depart 
outside the heartland in appropriate circumstances.118 
In addition, the Court addressed the appropriate standard of 
review in departure cases.119 The SRA established appellate review 
in criminal sentencing.120 Prior to Koon, the SRA directed 
appellate courts to accept a sentencing judge’s findings of fact 
unless they were “clearly erroneous” and to give “due deference” 
to the judge’s application of the Guidelines to the facts.121 The 
Sentencing Commission put in place appellate mechanisms to 
provide recourse to the defendant for an upward departure or to the 
                                                          
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 92. 
118 Id. at 96. The Supreme Court explained that a sentencing court 
considering a downward departure should ask four questions: 
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines’ 
“heartland” and make of it a special, or unusual, case? 2) Has the 
Commission forbidden departures based on those features? 3) If not, 
has the Commission encouraged departures based on those features? 4) 
If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those 
features? 
Id. at 95. 
119 Id. at 96. 
120 Michael Goldsmith & Marcus Porter, Lake Wobegon and the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines: The Problem of Disparate Departures, 69 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 57, 66 (2000) (discussing appellate review of district court departure 
decisions). 
121 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1995). 
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the 
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept 
the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly 
erroneous and . . . shall give due deference to the district court’s 
application of the guidelines to the facts. 
Id. 
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government for a downward departure.122 It did not, however, 
articulate the standard of review.123 Subsequently, in Koon, the 
Supreme Court determined that the appellate court should not 
review the departure decision de novo, but rather should apply the 
abuse of discretion standard.124 The Court noted that the text of the 
SRA reveals congressional intent that district courts retain much of 
their traditional sentencing discretion.125 Additionally, in 1988 
Congress amended the Guidelines to further emphasize the unique 
position of the district judge in determining the appropriate 
sentence.126 The language of the 1988 amendment imposed the 
requirement that the courts of appeals “give due deference to the 
district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.”127 
C. Downward Departures 
Departures afford a method to avoid mechanical application of 
the Sentencing Guidelines in appropriate circumstances.128 United 
States v. Vanleer provides an example of a case in which 
mechanical application of the Guidelines would have resulted in an 
                                                          
122 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
(2002). “If the court sentences within the guideline range, an appellate court 
may review the sentence to determine whether the guidelines were correctly 
applied. If the court departs from the guideline range, an appellate court may 
review the reasonableness of the departure.” Id. 
123 Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 
124 Koon, 518 U.S. at 91. 
125 Id. at 97. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
126 Koon, 518 U.S. at 97. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988). 
127 Koon, 518 U.S. at 97. After all, the Senate Report stated at the time of 
the creation of the Guidelines that “[t]he sentencing provisions of the reported 
bill are designed to preserve the concept that the discretion of a sentencing judge 
has a proper place in sentencing and should not be displaced by the discretion of 
an appellate court.” S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 150 (1983). 
128 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51-52 (1983). The Senate Report noted that 
“[t]he committee does not intend that the guidelines be imposed in a mechanistic 
fashion. It believes that the sentencing judge has an obligation to consider all the 
relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in an 
appropriate case.” Id. at 52. 
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excessive sentence.129 The defendant in that case had a history of 
non-violent criminal offenses related to his use of illegal drugs and 
had served time in prison for forgery.130 Prior to becoming a 
convicted felon, the defendant had given his shotgun to a friend.131 
Following his release from prison, the defendant needed money 
and took the shotgun to a pawn shop.132 During the transaction, he 
gave the sales clerk his correct name, address, and fingerprint to 
verify his identity.133 About one month later, a police officer 
conducted a record check and determined that the defendant was a 
convicted felon.134 The defendant pled guilty to being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.135 The appropriate sentencing range for 
this crime was 30 to 37 months.136 Vanleer requested a downward 
departure.137 The court explained that the basis for the downward 
departure was that the crime did not “threaten the harm or evil” 
intended to be prevented by the statute.138 In granting the 
downward departure, the deciding judge affirmed that 
“departures—both downward and upward—are a critical 
                                                          
129 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah 2003). 
130 Id. at 1319. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Vanleer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1319. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. The Guidelines explain: 
[C]onduct may not cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be 
prevented by the law proscribing the offense at issue. For example, 
where a war veteran possessed a machine gun or grenade as a trophy, 
or a school teacher possessed controlled substances for display in a 
drug education program, a reduced sentence might be warranted. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.11 (2003). Here, the harm or evil 
the law sought to prevent was violent crimes leading to personal injury or death. 
VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. The defendant’s conduct naturally did not 
threaten this because, in the words of the court, “VanLeer briefly possessed the 
gun only because he intended to dispose of the gun . . . . When a felon acts 
illegally to get rid of a firearm, that criminal offense is simply less culpable than 
when a felon continually possesses a firearm.” Id. at 1326. 
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component of the sentencing guideline scheme.”139 VanLeer was 
merely attempting to get rid of his gun to pay his rent so it would 
have been an unjust result for Vanleer to serve a full sentence.140 
In addition, departures contribute to the development of the 
Guidelines by providing feedback to the Commission on the way 
in which courts are applying the Guidelines.141 Congress created a 
duty on the part of the Sentencing Commission to periodically 
review and revise the Guidelines.142 The appropriate judge or 
                                                          
139 Id. at 1320. 
140 Id. at 1326-27. 
141 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
(2002). The Sentencing Commission notes that: 
First, it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that 
encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a 
sentencing decision. The Commission also recognizes that the initial set 
of guidelines need not do so. The Commission is a permanent body, 
empowered by law to write and rewrite guidelines, with progressive 
changes, over many years. By monitoring when courts depart from the 
guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so and court 
decisions with references thereto, the Commission, over time, will be 
able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures 
should and should not be permitted. 
Id. One commentator noted that “[a]ccording to reformers, an articulation and 
review of the reasons for deviating from the guidelines’ presumptive sentences 
would provide meaningful feedback for the continuous evolution of sentencing 
law and policy within the guidelines system.” Douglas A. Berman, Balanced 
and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that Undermines the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 34 (2000) 
(discussing departure jurisprudence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., the President of the American Bar Association, noted that 
“the departure power is a means of providing feedback from judges to the 
Sentencing Commission and Congress. By studying departure patterns, the 
Commission can identify those guideline rules that judges are consistently 
finding to be inappropriate for certain classes of defendants.” Letter from Alfred 
P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar Association to Senator Orrin G. 
Hatch, (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/departures. 
142 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2004). The Commission is responsible for: 
(a) Collecting systematically the data obtained from studies, research, 
and the empirical experience of public and private agencies concerning 
the sentencing process; (b) publishing data concerning the sentencing 
process; (c) collecting systematically and disseminating information 
PHILLIPSMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:25 PM 
 FEENEY AMENDMENT & JUDICIAL DISCRETION 973 
judicial officer is required to submit to the Commission a report.143 
The Commission uses the report to compile data files on federal 
sentencing practices to inform the decision-making process of 
amendments to the Guidelines.144 The result of the compilation 
process is that if particular portions of the Sentencing Guidelines 
are causing unjust results or failing to reflect changes in views on 
punishment of specific crimes, then the Sentencing Commission 
must adjust the Guidelines accordingly.145 This review process 
involves consulting with authorities and representatives of the 
Federal criminal justice system and recommending to Congress 
modifications of the Guidelines for which an adjustment appears 
                                                          
concerning sentences actually imposed, and the relationship of such 
sentences to the statutory purposes of sentencing set forth in [the 
Sentencing Reform Act]; (d) collecting systematically and 
disseminating information regarding effectiveness of sentences 
imposed; and, (e) maintaining and making available for public 
inspection a record of the final vote of each member on any action 
taken by it. 
Public Access to Sentencing Commission Documents and Data, 54 Fed. Reg. 
51279, 51279-80 (Dec. 13, 1989) (citations omitted). 
143 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (amended by Pub.L. 108-21, § 401(h)). Subsection 
(w) formerly read: 
The appropriate judge or officer shall submit to the Commission in 
connection with each sentence imposed (other than a sentence imposed 
for a petty offense, as defined in title 18, for which there is no 
applicable sentencing guideline) a written report of the sentence, the 
offense for which it is imposed, the age, race, and sex of the offender, 
information regarding factors made relevant by the guidelines, and such 
other information as the Commission finds appropriate. The 
Commission shall submit to Congress at least annually an analysis of 
these reports and any recommendations for legislation that the 
Commission concludes is warranted by that analysis. 
Id. 
144 Charles Loeffler, An Overview of U.S. Sentencing Commission Data, 16 
FED. SENT. R. 14 (Vera Inst. Just.) (Oct. 2003), at 1, available at 2003 WL 
23269265. 
145 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2004). The purposes of the United States 
Sentencing Commission are to “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in 
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.” Id. 
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appropriate.146 
D. Federal Prosecutors and the Sentencing Guidelines 
While the Sentencing Guidelines served to limit discretion 
exercised by judges, they transferred power over the sentencing 
system to the Executive.147 The federal prosecutor determines the 
charges against an offender, which directly impacts the sentencing 
range applied to the offender’s crime.148 The transfer of power to 
the federal prosecutor is evident in the relevant conduct and 
departure provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines.149 Under the 
Guidelines, the “relevant conduct” provision provides for the 
consideration in sentencing of alleged offender-conduct related to 
the offense, but not presented to the jury under the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard.150 The decision whether to raise the 
                                                          
146 28 U.S.C. § 994(r) (2004). The authorities involved in the consultation 
include the United States Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, the Criminal Division of the United States 
Department of Justice, and a representative of the Federal Public Defenders. 28 
U.S.C. § 994(o). 
147 Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 373. 
148 Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing, 28 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 161, 190 (1991) (noting that “[n]ot only does [the prosecutor] determine 
who should be charged and what the charges should be, but the information that 
he controls largely determines the time to be served by the offender.”). 
149 Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 384-95. Two commentators noted 
that “[p]erhaps nowhere in the Sentencing Guidelines is the discretion of the 
prosecutor, and the opportunity to abuse that discretion, more visible than in 
Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, innocently entitled ‘Relevant 
Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range).’” Id. at 384. 
150 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2003). 
Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range) (a) 
Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless 
otherwise specified, (i) the base offense level where the guideline 
specifies more than one base offense level, (ii) specific offense 
characteristics and (iii) cross references in Chapter Two, and (iv) 
adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be determined on the basis of the 
following: (1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, 
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the 
defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity 
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relevant conduct of an offender at sentencing is within the sole 
discretion of the prosecutor.151 The federal prosecutor retains the 
discretion to indict and charge the most readily provable offense 
and introduce the remaining charges at the sentencing hearing in 
which there are lower standards of admissibility and proof.152 
                                                          
(a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the 
defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a 
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in 
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred 
during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for 
that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or 
responsibility for that offense; (2) solely with respect to offenses of a 
character for which §3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple 
counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and 
(1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct or common 
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction; (3) all harm that resulted 
from the acts and omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) 
above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions; and 
(4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline. (b) 
Chapters Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood) and Five 
(Determining the Sentence). Factors in Chapters Four and Five that 
establish the guideline range shall be determined on the basis of the 
conduct and information specified in the respective guidelines. 
Id. One commentator noted that “[i]n jury conviction cases, the ‘relevant 
conduct’ standard allows the AUSA to introduce evidence of another crime at 
the sentencing stage that was withheld from trial because the AUSA could not 
prove it ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in 
the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 
101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1714 (1992) (discussing the background of the relevant 
conduct provision under the Guidelines). 
151 Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 389. 
152 Id. at 388-89. U.S. v. Ebbole illustrates the unjust consequences that can 
result from this system. See United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495 (7th Cir. 
1990). There, the defendant was sentenced to seven years and eight months in 
federal prison after pleading guilty to distributing a gram of cocaine to an 
undercover police officer. Id. at 1495. The plaintiff’s presentence report 
contained evidence that he had purchased 1.7 kilograms of cocaine in the time 
period surrounding the encounter with the undercover police officer. Id. The 
court noted that had the report contained only the quantities that the plaintiff 
pled guilty to distributing then the sentencing range would have been 27 to 33 
months. Id. at 1495-96. Plaintiff argued that “due process requires that judges 
have the discretion to discount penalties imposed for uncharged conduct because 
PHILLIPSMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:25 PM 
976 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
The departure provisions of the Guidelines have also enhanced 
prosecutorial discretion.153 The Sentencing Guidelines provide that 
the court may depart from the Guidelines upon motion of the 
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person 
who has committed an offense.154 Although the sentencing judge 
retains final authority to impose the departure, the judge may 
exercise this power only with prosecutorial approval.155 It is within 
prosecutorial discretion, therefore, to alter the sentence of an 
offender by making a substantial assistance motion.156 Thus, the 
Guidelines have enhanced the role of the federal prosecutor in 
criminal sentencing.157 
III. AMBER ALERT AND CONGRESS’ ENACTMENT OF THE FEENEY 
AMENDMENT AND THE PROTECT ACT 
As Congress has the power to determine the scope of judicial 
discretion, the enactment of the Feeney Amendment raises the 
question whether Congress is dissatisfied with the level of judicial 
discretion currently exercised by federal judges. On the surface it 
may appear so.158 Representative Feeney and the DOJ evaded a 
                                                          
the prosecution need establish such acts by only a preponderance of the evidence 
presented for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 1496. The court held that application 
of the relevant conduct provision did not deny defendant but that the relevant 
conduct provision of the Guidelines invites the prosecutor to indict for a less 
serious offense and then expand them at sentencing. Id. at 1501. The court 
further noted that in this case, the “United States Attorney’s office appears to 
have accepted this dubious invitation.” Id. 
153 Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 389-95. 
154 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2001). 
155 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 76. 
156 Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 390. 
157 Heaney, supra note 148, at 190. 
158 How Will Judicial Discretion Change under the Feeney Amendment?, 
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 23, 2004, at M12. Judge John S. Martin, of the Southern District 
of New York, who resigned last year in protest over the Feeney Amendment, 
observed: 
Everybody talks about the Feeney Amendment, and they say, well, this 
is what Congress wanted. Hogwash . . . . Because, if the Justice 
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meaningful debate, however, on the underlying implications of 
their measure to reduce judicial discretion by attaching it in a last 
minute maneuver to the AMBER Plan, a widely supported 
legislative effort to codify a successful system that works to 
quickly locate kidnapped children.159 
A. Congress and Amber Alert 
In 1997, the AMBER (America’s Missing: Broadcast 
Emergency Responses) Plan, a partnership between law-
enforcement agencies and broadcasters to activate an urgent 
bulletin in child-abduction cases, was created in response to the 
kidnapping and murder of Amber Hagerman in Arlington, 
Texas.160 In 2001, the National Center for Missing & Exploited 
                                                          
Department were so sure that this is what Congress wanted, why did 
they use stealth tactic? Why didn’t they allow Congress to hold 
hearings, and hold these issues up to the light of day, and say: “Is this a 
problem?” 
Id. 
159 149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6712 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy noted that “[b]ecause the Feeney Amendment 
was introduced at the last possible moment, Congress was deprived of full and 
balanced information on whether departure decisions are made in inappropriate 
instances.” Id. In addition, Senator Kennedy observed: 
[The Feeney Amendment] has nothing to do with protecting children, 
and everything to do with handcuffing judges and eliminating fairness 
in our federal sentencing system. Its provisions effectively strip Federal 
judges of discretion to impose individualized sentences, and transform 
the longstanding sentencing guidelines system into a mandatory 
minimum sentencing system. 
149 CONG. REC. S7528-01, 7531 (daily ed. June, 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). Senator Leahy noted that “House Republicans saddled the bipartisan, 
non-controversial AMBER Alert bill with numerous unrelated and ill- conceived 
provisions, collectively known as the ‘Feeney Amendment’ . . . .” 149 CONG. 
REC. S9115-02, 9115 (daily ed. July 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
160 Nat’l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, About AMBER Plan, at 
http://www.missingkids.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2004). In response to the 
murder of Amber Hagerman, the Dallas/Fort Worth Association of Radio 
Managers joined local law-enforcement agencies in northern Texas to develop a 
warning system to quickly locate abducted children. Id. Once law enforcement 
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Children (NCMEC) launched the AMBER Plan to assist localities 
with creating their own emergency alert plan.161 Subsequently, a 
series of high-profile kidnappings demonstrated the need for 
legislative action in this area to encourage adoption of AMBER 
Alert plans nationwide.162 As a result, the National Amber Alert 
Network Act of 2002 was introduced in the Senate and House, 
respectively as S. 2896 on September 3, 2002, and H.R. 5326 on 
September 4, 2002.163 
The main thrust of the National Amber Alert Network Act of 
2002 was to create a national AMBER alert system to assist local 
and state authorities in tracking kidnappers who attempt to cross 
state lines.164 The bill authorized the Attorney General, in 
cooperation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Chairman 
                                                          
authorities receive notification about an abducted child, they determine whether 
the situation warrants an alert. Id. If it does, alert information is compiled 
including descriptions and pictures of the missing child, the suspected abductor, 
a suspected vehicle, and any other information available and valuable to 
identifying the child and suspect. Id. The information is sent to designated radio 
stations under the Emergency Alert System (EAS). Id. The radio stations send 
the information to area radio and television stations where it is immediately 
broadcast. Id. Some states also employ electronic highway billboards, typically 
used to disseminate traffic information to drivers, to alert the public of abducted 
children. Id. 
161 Id. 
162 148 CONG. REC. H7048-01, 52 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2002) (statement of 
Rep. Jackson-Lee). Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) stated that 
throughout “the country we have seen a rash of children being abducted . . . . 
Still, the vast majority of America’s communities have not established an Amber 
Plan to protect our children. That is why it is critical that Congress moves to 
build on the success of the AMBER Plan.” Id. 
163 H.R. REP. NO. 107-723(I), at 90 n.1, 2 (2002). On September 3, 2002, 
Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Kay Hutchinson (R-TX) introduced S. 
2896. Id. at n.2. On September 4, 2002, Representatives Martin Frost (D-TX) 
and Jennifer Dunn (R-TX) introduced H.R. 5326, the companion bill in the 
House of Representatives. Id. at n.1. 
164 Id. at 89. Representative Royce (R-CA) stated that there “is no national 
coordination . . . . With the recent expansion of the AMBER Alert Program, a 
system is needed to ensure that neighboring states and communities will be able 
to honor each other’s alerts when an abductor is traveling with the child to other 
parts of the country.” 148 CONG. REC. NO. H7048-01, 7053 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 
2002) (statement of Rep. Ed Royce). 
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of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to appoint a 
National AMBER Alert Coordinator to direct the Alert’s 
communication network regarding abducted children.165 The bill 
also created two federal grant programs to assist and encourage 
states to implement the costly AMBER Alert system.166 S. 2896 
quickly passed the Senate on September 10, 2002.167 
H.R. 5326 stalled in the House, however, because House 
Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-
WI) introduced his own legislation, H.R. 5422, which included the 
provisions of H.R. 5326 but added several other measures.168 
                                                          
165 Patrick Leahy, An Amber Alert Nationl [sic] System, CONG. TESTIMONY, 
Sept. 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25098327. 
166 Id. The bill provided funding for statewide notification and 
communication systems, including overhead electronic highway notification 
boards, along highways. Id. In addition, it provided a grant program managed by 
the Attorney General for the support of AMBER Alert communications plans 
with law enforcement agencies and others in the community. Id. 
167 H.R. REP. NO. 107-723(I), at 90 n.3. 
168 News Advisory, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Sensenbrenner Introduces Comprehensive Child Abduction Prevention Bill 
(Sept. 24, 2002), at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/news0924 
02.htm. H.R. 5422 included H.R. 4679, providing judges with discretion to 
permit supervision of released sex offenders for a maximum of life, which 
passed the House by a vote of 409-3 but was blocked in the Senate. Id. It also 
included H.R. 1877, adding new wiretap provisions relating to sexual crimes 
against children, which passed the House by a vote of 396-11 but was blocked in 
the Senate. Id. It also contained H.R. 4477, dealing with persons who travel to 
foreign countries to engage in sexual activities with minors, which passed the 
House by a vote of 418-8 but was blocked in the Senate. Id. H.R. 5422 also 
included H.R. 2146, establishing mandatory life imprisonment for twice-
convicted child sex offenders, passing the House by a vote of 382-34 and 
blocked in the Senate. Id. The concern of opponents of H.R. 5422 was that if the 
Senate had refused to pass these controversial measures before, then the 
AMBER Plan provisions would not be implemented because the Senate would 
refuse to pass a bill saddled with the same provisions it had already refused in 
the past. See 148 CONG. REC. H7048-01, 7051 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2002) 
(statement of Rep. Scott) (explaining that if “the Senate has not seen fit to take 
any of them up because they do not have sufficient merit, now or in the last 
three Congresses, why would we think the Senate would see more merit in them 
with more new death penalties and additional mandatory minimums?”). Of 
particular concern was that H.R. 5422 contained a “two strikes you’re out” 
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Opponents of the extra provisions called for the enactment of a 
clean Amber Alert bill.169 In reaction to the stalemate, President 
Bush, on October 2, 2002, urged the Republican leadership in the 
House to pass the AMBER Alert legislation, S. 2896, drafted by 
                                                          
provision which mandated life imprisonment if the offender had a prior sex 
conviction in which a minor was the victim, unless the sentence of death was 
imposed. Id. The “two strikes you’re out provision” was controversial because 
of its broad definition of sexual activity, which included consensual sexual 
activity between an 18-year old and his 14-year-old girlfriend. Id. Another 
serious concern was the bill would have a disproportionate affect on Native 
Americans because it only applied where there was federal jurisdiction. Id. 
Additionally, victims may be reluctant to come forward to report sex crimes by 
family members if the victim knows the offender will serve life without parole. 
Id. 
169 H.R. REP. NO. 107-723(I), at 89 (2002). Representatives John Conyers, 
Jr. (D-MI), Howard L. Berman (D-CA), Robert C. Scott (D-VA), and Melvin L. 
Watt (D-NC), all Democratic members of the House Judiciary Committee, 
explained in the dissenting view in the House report: 
We are very disappointed with the approach being taken by the 
Majority to deal with the very serious problem of child abduction . . . . 
Bipartisan legislation was introduced . . . that would create a national 
Amber alert system to assist local and state authorities in tracking 
kidnappers that attempt to cross state lines. That bipartisan bill quickly 
passed the Senate and it should have quickly passed the House and 
been sent on to the president. Instead, what we have is a bill that 
includes the non-controversial Amber alert provisions and far more 
controversial provisions concerning death penalties, mandatory 
minimum sentences, wiretap extensions, pre-trial release, and a whole 
host of other unrelated provisions. 
Id. Opposition to H.R. 5422 focused, in part, on its mandatory minimum 
sentences and death penalty provisions. H.R. REP. 107-723(I), at 89-90 (2002). 
Representatives Conyers, Berman, Scott, and Watt stated: 
The majority knows that many on this side of the aisle cannot as a 
matter of principal support the death penalty and mandatory minimum 
sentences, particularly with all of the problems we have seen in these 
areas in this country . . . . Namely, the unacceptably high rate of 
wrongful convictions, inadequate legal representation and a system that 
is applied in a racially discriminatory manner . . . . Mandatory 
minimum sentences have been studied extensively and have been 
shown to be ineffective in preventing crime, to distort the sentencing 
process and to be a considerable waste of taxpayers’ money. 
Id. 
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Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) and Diane Feinstein (D-
CA), which was the same as the original legislation, H.R. 5326, 
introduced in the House.170 Bush explained that “[t]he House 
hasn’t acted yet, so I am going to,” and announced the 
implementation of a modified version of AMBER Alert.171 He also 
stated that “[i]f possible, it would be very helpful if the House 
passed the Hutchison-Feinstein law before they go home.”172 
Nevertheless, on October 8, 2002, the House approved 
Representative Sensenbrenner’s bill, H.R. 5422, by a 390-24 
margin.173 There was not enough time left in the legislative 
session, however, to reconcile the two different versions passed by 
the House and Senate.174 
The National Amber Alert Network Act was reintroduced in 
Congress at the beginning of the next legislative session.175 The 
bill unanimously passed the Senate on January 21, 2003.176 On 
March 5, 2003, Chairman Sensenbrenner introduced H.R. 1104, 
which was virtually identical to H.R. 5422.177 Chairman 
                                                          
170 Bush Promotes ‘Amber Alert’ System; House Urged to Pass Bill 
Targeting Child Kidnappings, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2002, at A02. 
171 Id. President Bush’s plan called for the placement of an AMBER Alert 
coordinator at the DOJ and the designation of $10 million to “AMBER training 
and education programs and to facilitate the use of overhead electronic highway 
message boards and other systems as part of AMBER Alert Plans.” President 
Bush Announces Immediate Action to Improve AMBER Alert System, U.S. 
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 2, 2002, at 2002 WL 22072232. 
172 Bush Promotes ‘Amber Alert’ System; House Urged to Pass Bill 
Targeting Child Kidnappings, supra note 170, at A02. 
173 House Overwhelmingly Passes Comprehensive Child Abduction 
Prevention Legislation; Sensenbrenner Urges Swift Senate Action, U.S. 
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 8, 2002, 2002 WL 22072456. 
174 Bush Promotes ‘Amber Alert’ System; House Urged to Pass Bill 
Targeting Child Kidnappings, supra note 170, at A02. 
175 H.R. REP. NO. 108-47(I), at 110 n.1, 2 (2003). On January 9, 2003, the 
National AMBER Alert Network Act of 2003 was reintroduced as S.121 by 
Senators Feinstein and Hutchinson. H.R. REP. NO. 108-47(I), at 110 n.2 (2003). 
On January 28, 2003, the companion bill was reintroduced as H.R. 412 by 
Representatives Frost and Dunn. H.R. REP. NO. 108-47(I), at 110 n.1 (2003). 
176 H.R. REP. NO. 108-47(I), at 110 n.2 (2003). 
177 H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
Chairman Sensenbrenner stated that “[H.R. 1104] is virtually identical to H.R. 
PHILLIPSMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:25 PM 
982 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Sensenbrenner (R-WI) argued that a stand-alone AMBER bill 
would merely codify current practice and that a more 
comprehensive approach was required to address the problem of 
child abductions.178 The same concerns remained, however, that 
implementation of the AMBER plan would fail due to 
congressional divisiveness over an AMBER Alert bill encumbered 
with controversial provisions.179 Meanwhile, on January 13, 2003, 
                                                          
5422, which overwhelmingly passed the House last October by a vote of 390 to 
24. Like so many other meritorious bills sent to the other body in the last 
Congress, this legislation was allowed to die by the Democrat leadership.” 149 
CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2405 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner). 
178 149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2406 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Sensenbrenner). Representative Melvin L. Watt (D-NC) stated, however, 
that: 
I am struck by the argument that the chairman of our committee has put 
forward to us. On the one hand, he says the AMBER Alert part of this 
bill really does nothing that is not already able to be done, and then I 
scratch my head and I said, well, if that is the case, why are we even 
here doing the AMBER Alert part of this? Is the AMBER Alert part of 
this bill, which all of us feel so strongly about, which all of us would 
vote for in a heartbeat if it were a stand-alone bill, is it being used as a 
bus to load on all of these other controversial provisions that otherwise 
would not be considered? If these other provisions have merit, let them 
be considered as separate stand-alone bills, let us evaluate them, let us 
evaluate their impact on reducing crime and addressing the problems 
that exist in our Nation, and let the Senate and the House vote on those 
things separately. 
Id. at 2408-09 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Watt). 
179 149 CONG. REC. S5137-01, 5138 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) stated: 
Twice now we rapidly passed our bill through the Senate on 
unanimous, bipartisan votes-last fall and again in January. Both times 
House leaders chose not to pass it, instead delaying its assured passage 
into law by using the bill as a “sweetener” for a package of other 
controversial provisions that the Senate has not previously 
considered . . . . Had House leaders opted to stand up and do what is 
right from the beginning, we would already have a nationwide AMBER 
Alert system in place to save our children’s lives when they are 
abducted. We will never know how many children could have been 
saved by a nationwide AMBER Plan-if the House had simply passed 
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S. 151, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools against the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act of 2003), was 
introduced in the 108th Congress by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) 
to address virtual child pornography.180 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-
VT) was the principal cosponsor.181 The Senate passed the 
PROTECT Act, S. 151, on February 24, 2003.182 On March 27, 
2003, the House took up H.R. 1104, the Child Abduction 
Prevention Act, which incorporated the text of S. 151.183 
As the debate between proponents of a clean AMBER Alert 
bill and those favoring Representative Sensenbrenner’s 
controversial bill continued in the House, Representative Tom 
Feeney (R-FL) introduced an amendment to H.R. 1104.184 The 
DOJ drafted the version of the Feeney Amendment introduced by 
Representative Feeney.185 The Feeney Amendment as introduced 
would have virtually eliminated the ability of judges to depart 
downward from the Guidelines, thereby eliminating the thoughtful 
imposition of sentences encouraged by Congress at the time of the 
enactment of the SRA.186 Debate on the Feeney Amendment was 
limited to twenty minutes.187 The Feeney Amendment presents yet 
                                                          
our bill when the Senate did, I daresay the number of children rescued 
from their abductors and death would be much higher. Efforts to 
protect our children do not deserve to be used as pawns by groups who 
play politics by attaching it to more controversial measures. 
Id. 
180 S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 1-2 (2003). 
181 Id. 
182 S. 151, 108th Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
183 House Overwhelmingly Approves Child Protection Legislation; Includes 
Amber Alert, Strong Penalties Against Kidnappings, Other Protections, supra 
note 173. See generally 149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5114-15 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 
2003). See also S. 151, 108th Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov, for 
the bill summary of S. 151. 
184 149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Feeney). 
185 Cohen & Fields, supra note 12, at A1. Representative Feeney said that 
he was the “messenger” of the amendment that was drafted by two Justice 
Department officials. Id. 
186 See supra text accompanying notes 65, 91. 
187 See H.R. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2003), available at 
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another example of attempts by certain members of Congress to 
manipulate the valid and uncontroversial goals of the AMBER 
Alert bill.188 The amendment passed by a vote of 357 to 58.189 
One reason members of the House may have voted for H.R. 
1104, however, is because of concern and frustration over the 
delay in enactment of the AMBER Alert portions of the bill.190 
Protection of children is a highly charged issue, particularly in 
light of the recent spate of high profile kidnappings, but the issue 
was virtually lost in the controversial measures that were attached 
to the AMBER Plan.191 The AMBER Plan is a highly successful 
                                                          
http://thomas.loc.gov/ (limiting debate on Rep. Feeney’s amendment to twenty 
minutes). 
188 149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Scott). Representative Scott state in opposition to Representative Feeney’s 
proposal that “this amendment would have the effect of turning the sentencing 
guidelines into mandatory sentences in the cases it affects. We have not had 
hearings or markups on this matter; and this is not the way we should amend the 
sentencing guidelines, without thought or consideration.” Id. 
189 VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d. 1318, 1321 (D. Utah 2003). See also United 
States v. Mellert, No. CR 03-0043, 2003 WL 22025007, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 
30, 2003). 
190 149 CONG. REC. H3059-02, 3072 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Kilpatrick). Representative Kilpatrick stated in the subsequent conference 
committee report on the PROTECT Act: 
It is vital that we implement AMBER Alert systems, not just in our 
local communities, but nationwide. Our efforts to crack down on child 
abductors and abusers will be fruitless if we cannot transcend state 
borders quickly enough to catch these vicious criminals . . . . There are 
many provisions in this bill that, while attempting to deter these 
criminals from committing such heinous acts, infringe upon the 
livelihoods of many innocent individuals and prohibit what would 
normally be harmless, legal acts. I vote for the H.R. 1104, the House 
version of this conference report in hopes that conferees would come 
together and agree upon a bill that would attack the key issue at hand, 
protecting our children from molesters and pedophiles. After reviewing 
the conference report, I did not see any substantive alterations or any 
elimination of these bad provisions, but rather I noticed additional 
provisions that, again, hurt the livelihood of innocent individuals and 
legal acts. 
Id.  
191 149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2406 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of 
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system to recover kidnapped children; it does not involve the 
sentencing and punishment of criminals.192 Indeed, attaching the 
largely unrelated provisions of the Feeney Amendment to the 
AMBER Alert bill made it difficult for those legislators who 
opposed the DOJ’s attack on judicial discretion to oppose H.R. 
1104.193 Thus, the Feeney Amendment was included in the version 
the House passed.194 On April 10, the different versions passed by 
the Senate and House went to a Conference Committee to resolve 
the differences between them.195 
B. The Original Feeney Amendment 
The original Feeney Amendment contained a “Sentencing 
Reform” provision that would have restricted downward 
departures in all cases.196 Downward departures would be 
                                                          
Rep. Scott). Representative Scott stated: 
Last Congress, many of us warned the majority that coupling the 
AMBER Alert bill with controversial sound bites would mean that 
neither the AMBER Alert nor the sound bites would be passed, but the 
House passed the same kind of omnibus bill anyway; and, as expected, 
the whole thing died in the Senate. Yet, here we are again facing the 
same misguided strategy and this time again with even more reasons 
for the Senate to reject the bill which the AMBER Alert bill is buried 
in. 
Id. 
192 Nat’l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, About Amber Plan, at 
http://www.missingkids.com (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). 
193 Lawrence S. Goldman, The Feeney Amendment, 27 CHAMPION 4, 4 
(June 2003) (discussing passage of the Feeney Amendment). One commentator 
observed that “[a] vote against Amber Alert would have been like a vote against 
motherhood and few legislators were willing to have to defend such a vote to 
their constituents.” Id. 
194 House Again Passes Virtual Child Porn Ban, WARREN’S WASH. 
INTERNET DAILY, Mar. 28, 2003, at 2003 WL 16116966. 
195 See 149 CONG. REC. S5113-01 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) for the record 
of the Conference Committee meeting. 
196 149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Feeney). “This would eliminate ad hoc departures based on vague grounds, 
such as ‘general mitigating circumstances.’” Id. His proposal, however, met 
opposition: 
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permissible only to the extent that the grounds had been 
“affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground 
of downward departure in the sentencing guidelines or policy 
statements,” which would eliminate the “heartland” approach 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Koon.197 Additionally, the 
original Feeney Amendment required courts of appeals to review 
de novo the district court’s application of the Guidelines.198 It also 
required the Attorney General, not later than 15 days after a district 
court’s grant of a downward departure in any case, other than a 
case involving a downward departure for substantial assistance, to 
report the departure to the House and Senate Committees on the 
Judiciary, setting forth the facts involved and the identity of the 
district court judge.199 Additionally, it required the Chief Judge of 
each district to submit a written report in every criminal case to the 
Sentencing Commission with sentencing, offense, and offender 
information, and required the Commission to make the reports and 
underlying documents available to the House and Senate 
Committees on the Judiciary.200 The DOJ did not notify or consult 
                                                          
This amendment would have the effect of turning the sentencing 
guidelines into mandatory sentences . . . . The purpose of the 
sentencing guidelines is to provide intelligent consistency in 
sentencing, considering each sentence within the overall framework of 
other sentences, and ensuring that the more serious crimes get more 
serious punishment. 
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Scott). 
197 Provisions of Original Feeney Amendment as Introduced and Passed by 
the House of Representatives March 27, 2003, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 336, 
June, 2003, at 1. See § 401(a)(2)(A). The specific offender characteristics which 
would have warranted downward departure included age and extraordinary 
physical impairment. Id. at 2. Drug, alcohol, or gambling dependence or abuse 
was not a reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines. Id. See also 149 
CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Feeney). 
198 Provisions of Original Feeney Amendment as Introduced and Passed by 
the House of Representatives March 27, 2003, supra note 197, at 4. See § 
401(d)(2). 
199 Id. at 8. See § 401(l)(1). 
200 Id. at 6. See § (h)(1)-(3). 
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with the Sentencing Commission in advance of the introduction of 
the Feeney Amendment in the House.201 
Proponents of the limitations on judicial discretion contained in 
the Feeney Amendment explained that judges had been departing 
from the Guidelines at an increasing rate since Koon because the 
decision underscored the available justifications for departures.202 
Representative Feeney introduced the amendment to “address the 
long-standing and increasing problems of downward departures 
from the Federal sentencing guidelines.”203 The DOJ supported the 
original version of the Feeney Amendment because it “enacts long-
overdue reforms to address the longstanding, and still-growing, 
problem of downward departures from the Sentencing 
Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines.”204 Representative 
Feeney explained that the rate of downward departures for reasons 
other than providing substantial assistance to federal prosecutors 
increased 51 percent from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001.205 
The DOJ explained in a letter to Congress supporting the original 
Feeney Amendment that the rate of departures in non-immigration 
cases has climbed from 9.6 percent in 1996 to 14.7 percent in fiscal 
year 2001.206 
                                                          
201 Cohen & Fields, supra note 12, at A1. Commissioner Michael O’Neill 
said that “Clearly, you’d like to have had a lot more debate.” Id.   
202 Tom Perrotta, Foes of Limits on Sentence Departures Make Headway, 
N.Y. L. J., Apr. 10, 2003, at col. 4. Representative Feeney stated that Koon gave 
the “green light” to district courts who have increasingly granted downward 
departures since the decision. Tom Feeney, Reaffirming the Rule of Law in 
Federal Sentencing, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, July 1, 2003, at 2003 WL 74961888. 
203 149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2422 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Feeney). 
204 Perrotta, supra note 202, at col. 4. 
205 Feeney, supra note 202. According to Representative Feeney, the rate of 
downward departures in fiscal year 1997 was 12.1 percent compared to 18.3 
percent in fiscal year 2001. Id. 
206 Letter from Justice Department Supporting Original Feeney 
Amendment, 15 FED. SENT. R. 355 (Vera Inst. Just.) (June 2003), at 2, at 2003 
WL 22208851. The DOJ’s statement that the downward departure rate in cases 
other than substantial assistance and immigration has climbed to 14.7 percent in 
FY2001 conflicts with the Sentencing Commission’s date which places the rate 
at 10.2 percent. See supra text accompanying note 211. 
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Representative Feeney did not explain, however, that although 
the rate of non-substantial assistance departures has increased since 
the Koon decision, the vast majority of that increase is attributable 
to the fact that the number of departures in “fast-track” border 
districts more than tripled, from 1871 in 1996, to 5928 in 2001.207 
In fiscal year 2001, 79 percent of downward departures were 
requested by the Government.208 Thus, the DOJ has requested the 
majority of non-substantial assistance departures since Koon.209 
Indeed, the Sentencing Commission noted that policies 
implemented in districts with a high volume of immigration cases 
may affect departure rates.210 The non-substantial assistance 
departure rate without those districts reduced to 10.2 percent.211 
Furthermore, Senator Kennedy suggested the DOJ may have 
misled Congress because its letter of support did not mention that 
the Senate Report accompanying the SRA had anticipated a 
                                                          
207 Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar 
Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, (Apr. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/departures. 
Fast-track programs were established by United States Attorneys 
offices to expedite the prosecution of immigration cases; if an 
immigration offender pleads guilty in a timely fashion, the prosecutor is 
authorized to pursue an additional downward departure. Importantly, 
until the PROTECT Act, these departures were not authorized by the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The fast-track programs are no longer 
limited to immigration cases, prosecutors now have extended them to 
drug cases and do not limit their use to Southwestern border districts, 
but use them also in other high-volume or port-of-entry districts. 
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, NACDL FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, at http://www.nacdl.org/departures (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2003). 
208 Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar 
Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch 3 (Apr. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/departures (noting that “[i]n FY 2001, of 19,416 
downward departures awarded federal defendants, approximately 15,318 came 
on government motion.”) 
209 Id. 
210 Letter from the United States Sentencing Commission to Senators Hatch 
and Leahy 1 (Apr. 2, 2003), at http://www.nacdl.org/departures. 
211 Id. 
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departure rate of about 20 percent.212 The actual departure rate of 
10.2 percent reached without the inclusion of government 
authorized fast track departures is substantially lower than the 20 
percent anticipated by Congress.213 
Opposition to the Feeney Amendment centered on the 
sentencing and downward departures provisions and the attempt of 
the DOJ and Representative Feeney to push their amendment 
through Congress without any input from the Sentencing 
Commission, bar associations, or the federal judiciary.214 Senators 
Kennedy and Leahy expressed concern that the Feeney 
                                                          
212 149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6711 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy stated: 
The Justice Department . . . submitt[ed] a highly misleading letter on 
April 4th expressing its “strong support” for the Amendment. The 
Department argued that the Amendment was justified because an 
epidemic of lenient sentences was undermining the Sentencing Reform 
Act. It failed, however, to mention that the committee report 
accompanying the 1984 Act anticipated a departure rate of about 20 
percent. Today, the rate at which judges depart from the guidelines over 
the objection of the government is slightly more than 10 percent-well 
within acceptable rates. The Department claimed that there are too 
many downward departures from the sentencing guidelines, but it failed 
to mention that, according to the American Bar Association, almost 80 
percent of these departures are requested by the Justice Department 
itself. 
Id. 
213 S. REP. NO. 98-225, 425 n. 193 (1983) (citation omitted). The Senate 
Report stated that: 
The United States Parole Commission currently sets prison release 
dates outside its guidelines in about 20 percent of the cases in its 
jurisdiction. It is anticipated that judges will impose sentences outside 
the sentencing guidelines at about the same rate or possibly at a 
somewhat lower rate since the sentencing guidelines should contain 
recommendations of appropriate sentences for more detailed 
combinations of offense and offender characteristics than do the parole 
guidelines. 
Id. 
214 Perrotta, supra note 202, at col. 4. See Materials from Interested Groups 
Opposing Original Feeney Amendment, 15 FED. SENT. R. 346 (Vera Inst. Just) 
(June 2003), at 2003 WL 22208850, for letters and press releases written in 
opposition to the original Feeney Amendment. 
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Amendment, with its broad impact on judicial discretion, had been 
passed by the House with virtually no debate.215 The voting 
members of the Sentencing Commission expressed concern that 
the review and analysis procedures of the Commission had been 
bypassed.216 They also acknowledged congressional concern over 
                                                          
215 149 CONG. REC. S5137-01, 5145 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement by 
Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy stated: 
The substance of the Hatch-Sensenbrenner amendment-whether in the 
form that was voted on in conference, or in the form that was circulated 
after the conference adjourned-is just as outrageous as the way in which 
it was adopted. This amendment modifies in very limited ways the 
Feeney amendment, which was added to the bill on the House floor 
after only 20 minutes of debate. This far- reaching proposal will 
undermine the Federal sentencing system and prevent judges from 
imposing just and responsible sentences. In short, it amounts to an 
attack on the Federal judiciary. 
Id. Senator Kennedy stated that: 
In the final hours of the consideration of the AMBER bill in the House 
of Representatives, there was an amendment to the AMBER bill 
offered by Congressman Feeney. In a period of 20 minutes, it was 
accepted without any hearings. It was a part of the conference. The 
Feeney amendment affected the whole issue of sentencing, not just for 
these kinds of heinous crimes that take place against children but also 
against the underlying concept of our criminal sentencing provisions, 
affecting every type of criminal sentence, whether we are talking about 
terrorists, murderers, burglars or white-collar crime. The amendment 
had nothing to do with the abduction of children, but would affect all of 
the other circumstances. 
149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5116 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). 
216 Letter from the United States Sentencing Commission to Senators Hatch 
and Leahy 1 (Apr. 2, 2003), at http://www.nacdl.org/departures. The Sentencing 
Commission stated: 
We, the voting members of the United States Sentencing Commission, 
join in expressing our concerns over the amendment entitled, 
“Sentencing Reform” recently attached to Child Abduction Prevention 
Act of 2003, H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. 2003 . . . . In the past, with an 
issue of such magnitude, Congress has directed that the Commission 
conduct a review and analysis which would be incorporated in a report 
back to Congress. The Commission is uniquely qualified to serve 
Congress by conducting such studies due to its ability to analyze its 
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the increasing rate of departures from the Guidelines but requested 
that Congress allow the Commission to perform its statutory 
purpose of reviewing departures and recommending changes 
where appropriate.217 The Sentencing Commission also explained, 
however, that “[t]he Commission adopted the departure policy not 
only to carry out congressional intent but also in recognition of the 
limits of adopting a perfect guideline system that would address all 
human conduct that might be relevant to a sentencing decision.”218 
The American Bar Association expressed concern that the Feeney 
Amendment “would all but eliminate the discretionary power of 
federal judges to achieve justice in individual cases, and effectively 
transform the Sentencing Guidelines into a system of mandatory 
minimum sentences.”219 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 
expressing the view of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, wrote that “this legislation, if enacted, would do serious 
harm to the basic structure of the sentencing guideline system and 
would seriously impair the ability of courts to impose just and 
reasonable sentences.”220 The Federal Judges Association 
explained that “[t]his amendment undermines the essential 
                                                          
vast database, obtain the views and comments of various segments of 
the federal criminal justice community, review the academic literature, 
and report back to Congress in a timely manner. Indeed, such a process 
is contemplated by the original legislation which established the 
Commission over 15 years ago. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). 
Id. 
217 Id. The Sentencing Commission stated that it was undertaking an 
extensive review of all non-substantial assistance departures. Id. The 
Commission noted that there are a number of factors requiring examination 
before drawing conclusions about non-substantial assistance departure rates. Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar 
Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, 1 (Apr. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/departures. The letter stated that if the Feeney Amendment 
was adopted “all these dramatic changes would be accomplished through a 
House floor amendment to an unrelated bill, adopted without committee 
hearings by either the House or the Senate, or the benefit of consultation with 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the federal judiciary, or the organized Bar.” 
Id. 
220 Letter from Chief Justice William Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy 2 
(Apr. 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/departures. 
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attribute of judging, which is to apply the law to the specific case 
by making an informed and dispassionate judgment.”221 
C. The Final Version of the Feeney Amendment Passed by 
Congress 
As a result of these types of concerns, the departure provisions 
of the original Feeney Amendment were modified by an 
amendment introduced by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Lindsey 
Graham (R-SC), and Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), known as 
the Hatch-Sensenbrenner-Graham amendment.222 The final version 
of the amendment, however, retained many aspects of the original 
Feeney Amendment.223 The de novo appellate review standard 
would apply in all downward departure cases.224 The final version 
retained the requirement that the Chief Judge of each district court 
submit a report to the Sentencing Commission within 30 days 
following entry of judgment in every criminal case.225 
                                                          
221 Letter from the Federal Judges Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch 1 
(Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/departures. The Federal 
Judges Association also stated that “the Feeney Amendment eviscerates fifteen 
years of judicial practice following the Sentencing Reform Act as well as the 
cooperative efforts of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Judiciary to 
bring about a more just sentencing system.” Id. at 2. 
222 149 CONG. REC. H3059-02, 3062 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Feeney). 
223 See Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who’s Afraid of the Federal Judiciary: Why 
Congress’ Fear of Judicial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine a Generation 
of Reform, 27 CHAMPION 6, 12 (June 2003). Senator Leahy noted that “[d]espite 
such objections, and without any serious process in the House or Senate, these 
provisions were pushed through conference with minor changes and enacted.” 
149 CONG. REC. S9115-02, 9115 (daily ed. July 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
224 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2004) (stating that “the court of appeals shall 
review de novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts). 
225 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(h)(1)(a)-(f), 117 Stat. 650, 
672 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)). The PROTECT Act directs: 
The Chief Judge of each district court shall ensure that, within 30 days 
following entry of judgment in every criminal case, the sentencing 
court submits to the Commission a written report of the sentence, the 
offense for which it is imposed, the age, race, sex of the offender, and 
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Additionally, this version retained the requirement that the 
Attorney General send a report, including the identity of the judge, 
to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate not later than fifteen days after a district court’s 
grant of a downward departure in any case other than a case 
involving a downward departure for substantial assistance.226 
Procedurally, the final version requires judges to describe with 
specificity in writing all upward and downward departures.227 
                                                          
information regarding factors made relevant by the guidelines. The 
report shall also include—(A) the judgment and commitment order; (B) 
the statement of reasons for the sentence imposed (which shall include 
the reason for any departure from the otherwise applicable guideline 
range); (C) any plea agreement; (D) the indictment or other charging 
document; (E) the presentence report; and (F) any other information as 
the Commission finds appropriate. 
Id. 
226 Id. at § 401(l)(2)(A)-(B) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (note)). The 
PROTECT Act directs: 
Not later than 15 days after a district court’s grant of a downward 
departure in any case, other than a case involving a downward 
departure for substantial assistance to authorities . . . the Attorney 
General shall submit a report to the Committees on the Judiciary of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate containing the information 
described under subparagraph (B). (B) Contents—The report submitted 
pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall set forth—(i) the case; (ii) the facts 
involved; (iii) the identity of the district court judge; (iv) the district 
court’s stated reasons, whether or not the court provided the United 
States with advance notice of its intention to depart; and (v) the 
position of the parties with respect to the downward departure, whether 
or not the United States has filed, or intends to file, a motion for 
reconsideration. 
Id. 
227 Id. at § 401(c) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)). The law requires: 
The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the 
reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the 
sentence . . . . is not of the kind, or is outside the range, described in 
[the Guidelines] the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence 
different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with 
specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment . . . . 
Id. Previously the sentencing judge could orally state the reasons for a departure. 
VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1324. 
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Substantively, it only restricts downward departures in cases 
involving child crimes and sexual offenses.228 The new amendment 
limits the composition of the Sentencing Commission to “not more 
than three” federal judges instead of “at least three.”229 This 
provision was added during the Conference Committee’s one 
meeting on the AMBER Alert bill.230 Finally, it requires the 
Sentencing Commission to issue appropriate amendments to the 
guidelines to ensure that the incidence of downward departures is 
substantially reduced within 180 days of enactment of the Act. 231 
Congress agreed to this version and it became effective on April 
30, 2003.232 
                                                          
228 PROTECT Act § 401(b) codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)). Senator 
Leahy noted: 
Rather than directly address important measures to protect our children, 
the AMBER Alert conference committee effectively rewrote the 
criminal code on the back of an envelope. First, the final language 
established one set of sentencing rules for child pornographers and a 
more flexible set of sentencing rules for other Federal defendants, 
including terrorists, murderers, mobsters, civil rights violators, and 
white collar criminals. No one here believes that sex offenders deserve 
anything less than harsh sentences, but I cannot understand why we 
would treat the terrorists better. 
149 CONG. REC. S6708-01 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
229 PROTECT Act § 401(n)(1) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)). 
230 149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6713 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Leahy) (explaining that the provision reducing the number of members on 
the Commission was introduced during the Conference Committee meeting). 
231 PROTECT Act § 401(m)(1)(A). The Sentencing Commission complied 
with this requirement by amending the Sentencing Guidelines to substantially 
reduce the incidences of downward departures. See Report to the Congress: 
Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (October 2003), 
submitted in response to section 401(m) of the PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-21, available at http://www.nacdl.org/departures. 
232 VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. S. 151 incorporated H.R. 1104. 
House Overwhelmingly Approves Conference Report on Child Protection Legisl
ation, supra note 173. S. 151, however, modified the controversial “two strikes 
you’re out” provision. 149 CONG. REC. S5137-01, 5146 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 
2003) (statement by Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy stated that “[a]mong other 
things, the conference clarified that the ‘two strikes’ law would not apply to a 
defendant whose only prior sex conviction was a misdemeanor under state law. 
The conference also provided a limited affirmative defense for defendants 
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IV. THE FEENEY AMENDMENT RAISES CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
AND INTRUDES INTO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The intervention of several interested groups preserved the 
ability of judges to depart except in situations involving sexual 
offenses against children.233 The Feeney Amendment, however, 
impacts the judicial exercise of discretion and downward 
departures in less direct methods by limiting the number of judges 
who can serve on the Sentencing Commission, establishing judge 
specific reporting requirements, and overturning the deferential 
standard of review for departures from the Guidelines.234 These 
provisions represent a general effort to limit judicial discretion 
because of the perception by the DOJ and certain members of 
Congress that judges have been too lenient.235 
A. Limiting the Composition of the Sentencing Commission to 
“Not More than Three” Federal Judges 
The Feeney Amendment threatens to quiet the voice of the 
judiciary by limiting the composition of the Sentencing 
Commission to “not more than three” federal judges.236 The SRA 
located the Commission in the Judicial Branch and, as originally 
enacted, required that the membership of the Commission 
comprise “at least three” federal judges.237 As there are seven 
                                                          
convicted under certain Federal statutes that have less culpable applications.” Id. 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 214-21. 
234 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2004); 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2004); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
235 Laurie L. Levenson, The War on Sex Abuse, NAT’L L. J., June 2, 2002, 
at col. 4. 
236 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004). 
237 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2001). See supra Part II.B. It has been noted that: 
[Despite] the extraordinarily limited role that the 1984 bill left for the 
judiciary in appointing commissioners and developing the sentencing 
guidelines, the measure still proclaimed that the Commission would be 
an “independent commission in the judicial branch” . . . . The primary 
reason for this obfuscation was apparent: supporters were fearful that 
the Supreme Court might hold the Sentencing Commission 
unconstitutional unless it were considered part of the judicial, rather 
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voting members on the Commission, the Feeney Amendment 
changes the composition of the Commission so that there will 
never be a majority of federal judges contributing to the 
development of principled guidelines.238 The Feeney Amendment 
reduces the input of the judiciary, which is uniquely placed to 
consider sentencing issues, in the promulgation of the Guidelines 
and transfers increased power to Congress and the Executive in the 
sentencing system.239 
                                                          
than the executive, branch of government. Moreover, the insistence that 
the Sentencing Commission was part of the “judicial branch” made the 
proposed reforms appear less radical than they were. 
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 45. (footnotes omitted). 
238 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004). 
239 United States v. Mellert, No. CR-03-0043 MHP, 2003 WL 22025007, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003). Chief U.S. District Judge Marilyn Patel of the 
Northern District of California noted in a recent case that: 
This piece of legislation would add not only more mandatory 
minimums, but also insinuate Congress even further into the process of 
actually drafting and promulgating Sentencing Guidelines, thus taking 
over the role of the Sentencing Commission as well as the judiciary’s 
traditional role of sentencing. Indeed, [the PROTECT Act changes] the 
composition of the Sentencing Commission to delete the requirement 
that “at least three” of the members of the Commission be “Federal 
judges” to “not more than three”, further diluting the judiciary’s input 
and decision making with respect to the guidelines . . . . The thrust of 
the legislation is to remove more and more of the determination and 
discretion in sentencing from an independent judiciary and the 
Commission and vest it in the Department of Justice, which, of course, 
is a partisan in our system of justice. 
Id. at *1-2. Senator Leahy, a co-sponsor of the PROTECT Act, explained: 
The Hatch-Sensenbrenner amendment not only maintains the worst 
aspects of the controversial Feeney Amendment-provisions that have 
nothing to do with child protection-but also adds in new provisions that 
were not in the original Feeney Amendment. For example, it limits the 
number of Federal judges who can serve on the Sentencing 
Commission because, as Chairman Sensenbrenner explained, “we don’t 
want to have the Commission packed with Federal judges that have a 
genetic predisposition to hate any kind of sentencing guidelines.” I, for 
one, believe that judges are extremely valuable members of the 
Commission. They bring years of highly relevant experience, not to 
mention reasoned judgment, to the table. The Republicans apparently 
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The framers of the Constitution declined to assign the 
responsibility of federal sentencing to any one of the three 
branches.240 The sentencing system has always involved the 
participation of each branch of government.241 This sharing of 
responsibility is in accord with separation of power principles. The 
Supreme Court has observed that “[w]hile the Constitution diffuses 
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice 
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It 
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, 
autonomy but reciprocity.”242 The sentencing process reflects this 
integration of dispersed powers by affording Congress the power 
to set sentencing ranges and determine the scope of judicial 
discretion,243 the Executive the power to prosecute crimes,244 and 
the Judiciary the power to determine sentences and exercise 
discretion within the framework established by Congress.245 
                                                          
believe that their knowledge is of limited value. I find it ironic that the 
Republicans, in forcing through this measure, will undercut one of the 
signature achievements of Ronald Reagan’s Presidency-a firm, tough, 
fair system of sentencing in the Federal criminal justice system. 
149 CONG. REC. S5137-01, 5146 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
240 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364. The Supreme Court observed that 
“[h]istorically, federal sentencing—the function of determining the scope and 
extent of punishment—never has been thought to be assigned by the 
Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches of 
Government.” Id. 
241 Id. The Supreme Court has noted that “under the indeterminate-sentence 
system, Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a sentence within 
the statutory range (which he usually could replace with probation), and the 
Executive Branch’s parole official eventually determined the actual duration of 
imprisonment.” Id. at 365 
242 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 (1952). 
243 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364. 
244 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1002 (1983). Additionally, the President 
has the power to grant “reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United 
States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
245 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391. The Supreme Court noted the “consistent 
responsibility of federal judges to pronounce sentence within the statutory range 
established by Congress . . . .” Id. The Supreme Court also observed that the 
“Guidelines bind judges in their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in 
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Although Congress has the power to establish sentencing 
ranges, judicial contribution to the promulgation of the Guidelines 
is essential because of the political nature of criminal 
sentencing.246 The public’s perspective on crime is influenced by 
the media, and Congress reacts to public concerns by toughening 
criminal sentences.247 The danger of placing complete control over 
the development of the Guidelines in the hands of Congress is that 
members of Congress may be influenced by the need to appear 
“tough on crime” for reelection purposes rather than engage in a 
meaningful analysis of whether current sentencing practices are 
fair.248 Indeed, the evidence suggests that the sentencing system, 
                                                          
criminal cases.” Id. 
246 Strauss, supra note 21, at 1591-92. One commentator observed that 
“[s]ince the politicization of crime . . . in the 1960s, politicians’ fear of being 
labeled ‘soft on crime’ has led to a constant ratcheting-up of punitiveness.” Id. 
247 Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 19, at 28. Two commentators noted: 
[M]any guideline amendments are not initiated by the Commission 
based on research identifying flaws in the existing rules. The 
Guidelines are often amended because Congress directs the 
Commission to increase sentences for a particular type of crime, often a 
crime that has received media attention. For example, in 2000, 
Congress directed the Commission to increase penalties for trafficking 
in the “club drug” MDMA, commonly known as “ecstasy.” The 
Commission responded with an amendment doubling, and in some 
cases tripling, penalties. 
Id. Judge John S. Martin, Jr., of the Southern District of New York, noted that 
“Congress has tried to micromanage the work of the commission and has 
undermined its efforts to provide judges with some discretion in sentencing or to 
ameliorate excessively harsh terms.” John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their 
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31. 
248 Developments in the Law–Alternative Punishments: Resistance and 
Inroads, supra note 18, at 1967. One commentator noted: 
Few social problems receive more political attention than crime. When 
national crime rates soar, as they did from the 1960s through the early 
1990s, politicians respond to the public fear of violent crime by 
attacking the failure of government to accomplish its most basic 
purpose—the protection of its citizens. In our political culture, what are 
sometimes contemptuously referred to as “lock ‘em up” arguments 
resonate deeply with the electorate. Concerns about the cost- 
effectiveness of incarceration raised in the pages of scholarly journals 
and books, and other technical arguments, do not translate into 
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driven by mandatory minimums and the Guidelines, is leading to 
distortions of the fairness and equality originally intended by the 
Guidelines because these measures have resulted in a disparate 
impact on minorities.249 Additionally, America’s prison population 
has dramatically increased since the enactment of the Guidelines 
and the implementation of mandatory minimums.250 The 
constitutional guarantees of lifetime tenure and protection against 
salary diminishment enhance judicial impartiality and afford 
                                                          
effective campaign speeches. The public is fed up with crime and 
frustrated with theory and speculation that fail to produce the result 
they care about—safer streets. 
Id. 
249 Dan Rodricks, Given Failed War on Drugs, Lewis Charges No Surprise, 
BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 2004, at 1B. One commentator noted that “[t]he Sentencing 
Project in Washington reports that in 1980, the year Ronald Reagan was elected 
to his first term as president, there were 40,000 Americans in prison solely for 
drug offenses. By last year, that number had grown to 450,000, and 75 percent 
of them were black or Hispanic.” Id. Another critic observed: 
The number of African-American men in college is less than the 
number of those under supervision of the courts . . . . [The war on 
drugs] has seen the rate of imprisonment of drug offenders jump by 700 
percent since 1980; a war that depends on narrowly targeted law 
enforcement and on mandatory prison sentences . . . . The war on drugs 
has been disproportionately a war on young black men. 
James Carroll, American ‘Values’ Cast a Global Shadow, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 
30, 2003, at A15. Justice Anthony Kennedy recently reflected on the state of the 
nation’s prisons when he explained that “[w]ere we to enter the hidden world of 
punishment, we should be startled by what we see. Consider its remarkable 
scale. The nationwide inmate population today is about 2.1 million people . . . . 
We should revisit this compromise. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines should 
be revised downward.” Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar 
Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/departures. 
250 Rodricks, supra note 249, at 1B. One commentator noted that “[i]t took 
about 150 years for the American prison population to reach 500,000 inmates, 
and that occurred in 1980. Since then, the American penal nation has grown by 
1.6 million.” Id. Another critic observed that the “American prison population 
recently went over 2 million for the first time, putting the United States ahead of 
Russia as the world capital of incarceration . . . . Thirty years ago, one in 1,000 
Americans was locked up; today, almost five are.” Carroll, supra note 249, at 
A15. 
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judges greater protection against the same political and public 
pressures exerted on Congress.251 Federal judges uniquely 
contribute to the work of the Commission because of their greater 
impartiality and expertise in criminal sentencing.252 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed the necessity of the 
judicial role in sentencing when it upheld the constitutionality of 
the Sentencing Commission in Mistretta v. United States.253 The 
Petitioner argued that the participation of federal judges in the 
making of policy threatens the impartiality and non-partisanship of 
the Judicial Branch.254 The Supreme Court held that, although it “is 
a judgment that is not without difficulty,” the inclusion of federal 
judges on the Sentencing Commission does not threaten the 
impartiality of the judiciary because of one “paramount 
consideration,” the judicial function of criminal sentencing.255 The 
Court observed that “the Sentencing Commission is devoted 
                                                          
251 Gerald E. Rosen & Kyle W. Harding, Reflections Upon Judicial 
Independence as We Approach the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison: 
Safeguarding the Constitution’s “Crown Jewel”, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 
797 (2002) (noting that “[b]y insulating judges from political and public 
pressure, judicial independence affords courts the freedom to decide cases based 
on the law.”). 
252 149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6713 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy stated that “I, for one, believe that judges are 
extremely valuable members of the Commission. They bring years of highly 
relevant experience, not to mention reasoned judgment, to the table. The 
Republicans apparently believe that their expertise is of limited value.” Id. 
253 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 390-91. 
254 Id. at 397. The Court noted: 
We are somewhat more troubled by petitioner’s argument that the 
Judiciary’s entanglement in the political work of the Commission 
undermines public confidence in the disinterestedness of the Judicial 
Branch. While the problem of individual bias is usually cured through 
recusal, no such mechanism can overcome the appearance of 
institutional partiality that may arise from judiciary involvement in the 
making of policy. The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately 
depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That 
reputation may not be borrowed by the political Branches to cloak their 
work in the neutral colors of judicial action. 
Id. at 407. 
255 Id. 
PHILLIPSMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  1:25 PM 
 FEENEY AMENDMENT & JUDICIAL DISCRETION 1001 
exclusively to the development of rules to rationalize a process that 
has been and will continue to be performed exclusively by the 
Judicial Branch. In our view, this is essentially a neutral endeavor 
and one in which judicial participation is peculiarly 
appropriate.”256 Indeed, the Senate Report on the SRA approved 
the primacy of the relationship between federal sentencing and the 
judiciary: “Placement of the commission in the judicial branch is 
based upon the committee’s strong feeling that even under this 
legislation, sentencing should remain primarily a judicial 
function.”257 Thus, the Court observed that Congress had simply 
recognized the role of the judiciary in criminal sentencing.258 
Additionally, the Court stated that “judicial participation on the 
Commission ensures that judicial experience and expertise will 
inform the promulgation of rules for the exercise of the Judicial 
Branch’s own business—that of passing sentence on every 
criminal defendant.”259 Reducing the input of the judiciary to “not 
more than three” federal judges undermines the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Mistretta that the Sentencing Commission should 
properly be located in the Judicial Branch. 
Moreover, the requirement that “not more than three” federal 
judges sit on the Commission implies that the Commission does 
not have to contain any federal judges.260 Yet the opinion in 
Mistretta raises doubts about the constitutionality of the 
Commission if it is located in the Executive or Legislative 
Branches. One of the theories used by the Supreme Court in 
Mistretta to uphold the constitutionality of the SRA was that the 
                                                          
256 Id. 
257 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 159 (1983). 
258 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396-97. The Court noted: 
In sum, since substantive judgment in the field of sentencing has been 
and remains appropriate to the Judicial Branch, and the methodology of 
rulemaking has been and remains appropriate to that Branch, Congress’ 
considered decision to combine these functions in an independent 
Sentencing Commission and to locate that Commission within the 
Judicial Branch does not violate the principle of separation of powers. 
Id.   
259 Id. at 408. 
260 Vinegrad, supra note 86. 
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Sentencing Commission was properly located in the Judicial 
Branch because the judiciary is uniquely placed to consider 
sentencing issues: 
The Constitution’s structural protections do not prohibit 
Congress from delegating to an expert body located within 
the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating 
sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant 
statutory direction as is present here. Nor does our system 
of checked and balanced authority prohibit Congress from 
calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the 
Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely 
within the ken of judges. Accordingly, we hold that the Act 
is constitutional.261 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Mistretta entertained the 
hypothetical of a decision by Congress to place the task of creating 
sentencing guidelines within the Executive Branch: “[H]ad 
Congress decided to confer responsibility for promulgating 
sentencing guidelines on the Executive Branch, we might face the 
constitutional questions whether Congress unconstitutionally had 
assigned judicial responsibilities to the Executive or 
unconstitutionally had united the power to prosecute and the power 
to sentence within one Branch.”262 Reducing the composition of 
the Commission to a minority or no federal judges raises the 
question whether the Sentencing Commission is properly 
characterized as an agency within the Judicial Branch.263 
As the Court articulated in Mistretta, placement of the 
Commission in the Executive Branch raises separation of powers 
                                                          
261 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412. 
262 Id. at 391 n.17. The Court quoted Ronald L. Gainer, former Associate 
Deputy Attorney-General at the U.S. Department of Justice, where he 
supervised the Department’s fifteen-year effort to develop a new Federal 
Criminal Code, who testified in 1977 before the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Laws and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary of the 95th 
Congress that “[i]f guidelines were to be promulgated by an agency outside the 
judicial branch, it might be viewed as an encroachment on a judicial 
function . . . .” Id. 
263 Id. at 385-97. The Court emphasized that the Commission is an 
“independent” body, including at least three federal judges. Id. at 385. 
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issues because the Executive’s power to prosecute criminals and 
execute the laws would be linked with the power to create 
sentencing law.264 Indeed, Congress also recognized when it 
created the Commission that placing the Commission in the 
Executive Branch would inappropriately unite the power to 
prosecute with the power to set criminal sentences: 
Traditionally, the courts and Congress have shared 
responsibility for establishing Federal sentencing policy. 
Congress defines criminal conduct and sets maximum 
sentences, while the courts impose sentences in individual 
cases. Any suggestion that the Executive Branch should be 
responsible for promulgating the guidelines would present 
troubling constitutional problems. More importantly, it 
would fundamentally alter the relationship of the Congress 
and the Judiciary with respect to sentencing policy and its 
implementation. Giving such significant control over the 
determination of sentences to the same branch of 
government that is responsible for the prosecution of 
criminal cases is no more appropriate than granting such 
power to a consortium of defense attorneys.  
If the power of the Executive Branch to prosecute criminal 
violations were joined with the power to prescribe 
sentences for those convicted, it would constitute a 
potential for tyranny. These powers should not be lodged in 
the prosecuting branch any more than in a “consortium of 
defense attorneys.”265 
Not only does the Executive exercise the power to prosecute, but it 
also wields some control over the composition of the Commission 
in the President’s sole authority to appoint and remove the 
Commission’s members.266 Diluting judicial input in the work of 
                                                          
264 Id. at 391 n.17. In addition, the Court noted that “[i]n the field of 
sentencing, the Executive Branch never has exercised the kind of authority that 
Congress has vested in the Commission.” Id. at 387 n.14. 
265 U.S. v. Roy, 694 F. Supp. 635, 639 (D. Minn. 1988) (quoting House 
Report to Sentencing Revision Act of 1984, H.R. Res. 6012, H.R. Rep. No. 98-
1017, 98th Cong.2d Sess., Sept. 13, 1984 at 94-95) (citations omitted). 
266 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004). The President appoints the seven voting 
members of the Commission by and with advice and consent of the Senate. Id. 
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the Commission improperly concentrates power over the 
sentencing process in the Executive because of its already 
considerable authority to prosecute criminals and influence the 
composition of the Commission. 
Judicial involvement in the work of the Commission provides a 
safeguard against “transient political considerations.”267 If the 
Commission were to develop the Guidelines without the input of 
federal judges, then the function of the Commission to create 
sentencing law suggests that the Commission is a legislative body 
and should be subject to the legislative safeguards of bicameralism 
and presentment.268 In upholding the constitutionality of Congress’ 
                                                          
The federal judges are chosen from a list of six judges recommended to the 
President by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id. The members of 
the Commission are subject to removal only for neglect of duty or malfeasance 
in office or for other good cause shown. Id. 
267 Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar 
Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, (Apr. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/departures. The President of the American Bar 
Association wrote: 
By overriding the Sentencing Commission and legislatively rewriting 
the Guidelines, the Feeney Amendment threatens the legitimacy of the 
Commission. The Commission was created by Congress to ensure that 
important decisions about federal sentencing were made intelligently, 
dispassionately, and, so far as possible, uninfluenced by transient 
political considerations. Congress should accord the Commission and 
its processes some deference unless and until the Commission has 
demonstrably failed in its duties. 
Id. 
268 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413. Justice Scalia wrote in his sole dissenting 
opinion in Mistretta that locating the Commission in the Judicial Branch was 
unconstitutional because the Guidelines “have the force and effect of laws, 
prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive.” Id. The 
Constitution dictates that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to 
the President of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. With regard 
to the Presentment Clause, the Supreme Court has noted that the “President’s 
role in the lawmaking process also reflects the Framers’ careful efforts to check 
whatever propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, 
improvident, or ill-considered measures.” I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947-
48 (1983). In the context of bicameralism, the Supreme Court has observed that 
“[b]y providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of the 
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delegation of rulemaking power to the Commission, the majority 
opinion in Mistretta noted that delegation of rulemaking power 
“pursuant to a legislative delegation is not the exclusive 
prerogative of the Executive.”269 The majority opinion further 
noted that when “we characterized rulemaking as ‘Executive 
action’ not governed by the Presentment Clauses, we did so as part 
of our effort to distinguish the rulemaking of administrative 
agencies from ‘lawmaking’ by Congress which is subject to the 
presentment requirements of Article I.”270 By analogy, rulemaking 
authority delegated to agencies in the Judicial Branch is not subject 
to presentment and bicameralism requirements as reflected in the 
procedure for passing the Guidelines under the SRA.271 If the 
Commission, however, is “a sort of junior-varsity Congress,” as 
suggested by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Mistretta, 
then the promulgation of guidelines should receive the same 
legislative safeguards as other laws.272 
                                                          
prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized 
their belief . . . that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully 
and fully considered by the Nation’s elected officials.” Id. at 948-49. 
269 Id. at 387 n.14. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
270 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387 n. 14. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16. 
271 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2004). SRA directs: 
The Commission, by affirmative vote of at least four members of the 
Commission, and pursuant to its rules and regulations and consistent 
with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute shall promulgate and 
distribute to all courts of the United States and to the United States 
Probation System—(1) guidelines, as described in this section, for use 
of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a 
criminal case . . . . 
Id. 
272 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 427. Justice Scalia supported the majority’s 
opinion with regard to the petitioner’s delegation argument that “the doctrine of 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority has been violated because of 
the lack of intelligible, congressionally prescribed standards to guide the 
Commission.” Id. at 416. He disagreed with the majority, however, because “the 
power to make law cannot be exercised by anyone other than Congress, except 
in conjunction with the lawful exercise of executive or judicial power.” Id. at 
417. Executive and judicial powers are not lawfully exercised by the 
Commission because “[t]he lawmaking function of the Commission is 
completely divorced from any responsibility for execution of the law or 
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B. Reporting Requirements and Data Collection Provisions 
Interfere with Judicial Independence 
The reporting provisions of the PROTECT Act challenge the 
premise of judicial independence by establishing Executive and 
Legislative monitoring of the traditional judicial function of 
sentencing.273 The independence of the federal judiciary is a 
cornerstone of governmental structure and a fundamental 
component of separation of powers.274 Although the SRA limited 
                                                          
adjudication of private rights under the law.” Id. at 420. 
273 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 2003 Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus. 
gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003year-endreport.html. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
explained that the “subject matter of the questions Congress may pose about 
judges’ decisions, and whether they target the judicial decisions of individual 
federal judges, could appear to be an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to 
intimidate individual judges in the performance of their judicial duties.” Id. 
274 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. 
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). Alexander Hamilton recognized that the 
independence of the judiciary “guard[s] the constitution and the rights of 
individuals from the effects of those ill humours which the arts of designing 
men . . . sometimes disseminate among the people themselves . . . .” Id. at 405. 
He also observed the importance of the judiciary to the proper maintenance of 
separation of powers: 
Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance 
in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of [unjust and 
partial] laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of 
those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the 
legislative body in passing them . . . . 
Id. at 406. Hamilton also observed the weakness of the judiciary with regard to 
the legislative and executive branches. Id. at 402. He noted that the judiciary 
“has no influence over either the sword or the purse . . . [and] may truly be said 
to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.” Id. He noted the 
“natural feebleness of the judiciary,” and its “continual jeopardy of being 
overpowered, awed or influenced by its coordinate branches . . . .” Id. at 403. In 
recognition of this potential, the Constitution provides the judiciary with lifetime 
appointments, protection against salary diminishments while in office, and 
removal only by impeachment for violating the constitutional “good behavior” 
standard. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Chief Justice William Rehnquist explained: 
One of the critical challenges of American government is to preserve 
the legitimate independence of the judicial function while recognizing 
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the ability of judges to exercise discretion, it preserved the ability 
of judges to engage in individualized assessment of cases to the 
extent permitted by the departure provisions.275 The Feeney 
Amendment undermines judicial independence and provides a 
framework for intimidation of judges by requiring the Sentencing 
Commission to make available to the House and Senate 
Committees on the Judiciary, upon request, the written reports and 
all underlying records accompanying the reports, that the Chief 
Judge of each district court is required to submit in every criminal 
case to the Sentencing Commission.276 Additionally, the Feeney 
Amendment requires that the Sentencing Commission make 
available to the Attorney General, upon request, the data files that 
the Commission maintains based on the information provided by 
the Chief Judge, including the identity of the sentencing judge.277 
The data files contain, among other things, the judgment, statement 
                                                          
the role Congress must play in determining how the judiciary functions. 
Article III of the Constitution grants to Article III judges two 
significant protections of their independence: they have tenure during 
good behavior, and their compensation may not be diminished during 
their term of office. But federal judges are heavily dependent upon 
Congress for virtually every other aspect of their being—including 
when and whether to increase judicial compensation. 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Address at the Federal Judges Association 
Board of Directors Meeting (May 5, 2003), available at http://www.supreme 
courtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-05-03.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
275 149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5116 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy noted: 
As one of the authors of the Sentencing Reform Act, I can say that 
Congress did not intend to eliminate judicial discretion. We recognized 
that the circumstances that may warrant departure from the guideline 
range cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed or 
analyzed in advance. In interpreting the Act, both the Supreme Court 
and the Sentencing Commission have emphasized this point. This is not 
a partisan position. Judicial authority to exercise discretion when 
imposing a sentence was and is an integral part of the structure of the 
Federal sentencing guidelines and indeed of every guideline system in 
use today. 
Id. 
276 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(2) (2004). 
277 Id. at § 994(w)(4). 
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of reasons for the sentence imposed, any plea agreement, the 
presentence report, and any other information which the 
Commission finds appropriate.278 These reporting requirements 
hinder the traditional judicial function of sentencing by creating a 
tool for congressional and executive intimidation of judges who 
grant downward departures.279 
The reporting provisions of the Feeney Amendment are 
unnecessary because the Commission, located in the Judicial 
Branch, compiles sentencing information pursuant to its statutory 
mandate to periodically review and revise the Guidelines and 
report any amendments to Congress.280 Indeed, the Sentencing 
Commission is required to submit to Congress at least annually an 
analysis of the reports submitted by the Chief Judge of each district 
court and an accounting of those districts that the Commission 
considers have not complied with the reporting requirements.281 
The reporting provisions of the PROTECT Act, however, subject 
the decisions and identity of individual judges to full disclosure 
and review by the Executive and Congress even though the 
Sentencing Commission is already required to analyze and submit 
information on departure decisions.282 
                                                          
278 Id. at § 994(w)(1). 
279 149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5119 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy noted: 
I must express my deep concern for the provision of the legislation that 
requires the Commission to report to the Judiciary Committees of the 
Congress and even to the Attorney General confidential court records 
and even “the identity of the sentencing judge.” I do not believe that 
this provision serves any legitimate interests of the Congress. I do not 
believe that authorizing disclosure of this information to the executive 
branch is warranted. I have deep concerns that this provision lacks the 
respect owed by the Congress to a co-equal branch. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
280 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)-(p) (2004). 
281 Id. at § 994(w)(3). “The Commission shall submit to Congress at least 
annually an analysis of these documents, any recommendations for legislation 
that the Commission concludes is warranted by that analysis, and an accounting 
of those districts that the Commission believes have not submitted the 
appropriate information and documents required by this section.” Id. 
282 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)-(4) (2004). Leonidas Ralph Mecham, 
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One of the most troubling examples of the possible 
consequences of the reporting requirements was shown in the 
actions taken against Chief Judge James M. Rosenbaum of the 
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota after his 
testimony concerning a proposed amendment to the Guidelines.283 
In May 2001, the Sentencing Commission unanimously submitted 
to Congress a proposal to limit to a maximum of ten years the 
sentence defendants could receive who played a minor role in a 
drug operation.284 The amendment sought to resolve the problem 
that minor offenders carrying small amounts of drugs were 
receiving harsher sentences than supervisors in the drug trade since 
drug quantity is the determining factor in sentencing.285 In 
response to the proposed amendment, Representative Lamar Smith 
(R-TX) introduced H.R. 4689, for himself and among others, 
Representative Sensenbrenner, to block the Commission’s 
recommendation.286 
On May 14, 2002, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
                                                          
Secretary of the Judicial Conference of the United States wrote: 
Among other things, this data [provided by the Sentencing 
Commission] provides for each court the percentage of defendants who 
receive substantial assistance departures and the percentage of 
defendants who receive other downward departures. We urge Congress 
to meet its responsibility to oversee the functioning of the criminal 
justice system through use of this and other information without 
subjecting individual judges to the risk of unfair criticism in isolated 
cases where the record may not fully reflect the events leading up to 
and informing the judge’s decision in a particular case. 
Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, (Apr. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/departures. 
283 Douglas A. Kelley, Federal Judge Draws Congressional Ire, 60 BENCH 
& B. OF MINN. 22, 23-25 (2003) (describing House Republican’s response to 
Chief Judge Rosenbaum’s testimony). 
284 Tony Mauro, Judiciary Committee to Debate Disparity in Drug 
Sentences, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 21, 2002, at 4. See H.R. REP. NO. 
107-769, at 6-7 (2002) for a description of the amendment. 
285 Mauro, supra note 284, at 4. In one year, for example, couriers and 
mules were held accountable for almost as much powder cocaine (4,900 grams) 
as managers and supervisors (5,000 grams). H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, at 9 (2002). 
286 H.R. 4689, 107th Cong. (2002). 
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Homeland Security held a legislative hearing on H.R. 4689.287 
Judge Rosenbaum testified in support of the Commission’s 
amendment because it would contribute to the development of a 
more equitable system with respect to low-level drug offenders.288 
Judge Rosenbaum has a reputation for being a tough sentencing 
judge.289 He testified that the “present sentencing system sentences 
minor and minimal participants who do a day’s work, in an 
admittedly evil enterprise, the same way it sentences the planner 
and enterprise-operator who set the evil plan in motion and who 
figures to take its profits.”290 Before the Committee, he gave 
examples of actual cases involving low-level offenders where 
application of the Commission’s amendment would result in a 
more just outcome.291 
Following the hearing, the House Judiciary Committee 
requested from Judge Rosenbaum downward departure 
information in the cases he discussed in his testimony.292 Judge 
Rosenbaum supplied information which reflected that he had 
granted downward departures in certain cases but did not include 
the reasons for the departures.293 Judge Rosenbaum declined to 
provide further information following subsequent requests for 
departure information and suggested that the Committee order 
transcripts of the sentencing proceedings.294 The Committee did 
so.295 Based on the transcripts, the Committee charged that Judge 
Rosenbaum misrepresented the sentences imposed in the example 
cases because he had departed below the guideline range, belying 
                                                          
287 H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, at 7 (2002). 
288 Id. at 9. 
289 Kelley, supra note 283, at 22. Judge Rosenbaum was nominated by 
conservative Senator Rudy Boschwitz and appointed by President Ronald 
Reagan. Id. Additionally, his sentences for drug offenders exceeded the national 
median each year between 1998 and 2002. Id. 
290 H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, at 9-10 (2002). 
291 Kelley, supra note 283, at 22. Rosenbaum discussed several recent cases 
in the District of Minnesota. H.R. REP. 107-769, at 10 (2002). 
292 H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, at 10 (2002). 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 11. 
295 Id. 
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his testimony that the Commission’s amendment was necessary to 
mitigate unwarranted sentencing harshness.296 Within a week, the 
House Judiciary Committee, of which Representative 
Sensenbrenner is Chairman, accused Rosenbaum of misleading the 
Committee about his examples and demanded all of his documents 
because of his “record of hostility” to the Guidelines.297 Judge 
Rosenbaum refused, however, and the House Judiciary Committee 
threatened him with a subpoena.298 In February of 2003, the 
Judiciary Committee attempted to obtain Judge Rosenbaum’s 
records from the General Accounting Office (GAO), but was 
unsuccessful because the GAO does not investigate individual 
judges.299 The Committee did not rule out impeachment as a 
course of action against Judge Rosenbaum.300 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist revealed the troubling nature 
of the actions of the Judiciary Committee against Judge 
Rosenbaum.301 In a speech to the Board of Directors of the Federal 
Judges Association he stated that “Congress has recently indicated 
rather strongly, by the Feeney Amendment, that it believes there 
have been too many downward departures from the Sentencing 
Guidelines. It has taken steps to reduce that number. Such a 
                                                          
296 Id. at 13-14. 
297 Kelley, supra note 283, at 24. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, 9-32 (2002) 
for a complete description of the charges leveled against Rosenbaum. 
298 Jason Hoppin, Drug-Sentencing Probe Worries Bench, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 2003, at 4. The subpoena would have included 
“Rosenbaum’s records from his cases since Jan. 1, 1999, identifying drug-
related cases in which he departed from sentencing guidelines. He also has been 
asked to provide sentencing transcripts, the status of appeals, copies of all 
decisions and the names any court personnel who helped in his testimony before 
Congress.” Rob Hotakainen & Pam Louwagie, State’s Chief U.S. Judge Might 
Face Subpoena; House Panel Investigating Sentencing in Drug Case, STAR 
TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 2002, at 1A, available at 2003 WL 5530675. 
299 Kelley, supra note 283, at 24. See also Hoppin, supra note 298, at 4. 
300 Kelley, supra note 283, at 24 (citing Jess Braven & Gary Fields, House 
Panel to Probe U.S. Judge: Minnesota Jurist’s Records Expected to be 
Subpoenaed in an Unusual Showdown, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2003)). 
301 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the 
Federal Judges Association Board of Directors meeting, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-05-03.html (May 5, 
2003). 
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decision is for Congress, just as the enactment of the Sentencing 
Guidelines nearly 20 years ago was.”302 He also affirmed that 
collection of information about sentencing practices is “a 
legitimate sphere of congressional inquiry, in aid of its legislative 
authority.”303 While Chief Justice Rehnquist approved of the 
general authority of Congress to collect information in aid of 
formulating legislation on sentencing, he went on to explain that 
individualized collection of information on a judge-by-judge basis 
“is more troubling . . . . For side-by-side with the broad authority 
of Congress to legislate and gather information in this area is the 
principle that federal judges may not be removed from office for 
their judicial acts . . . . [A] judge’s judicial acts may not serve as a 
basis for impeachment.”304 This principle, the Chief Justice 
observed, has existed for nearly 200 years, following the trial of 
Justice Samuel Chase of the Supreme Court by the Senate.305 
                                                          
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. The Chief Justice remarked: 
Chase was one of those people who are intelligent and learned, but 
seriously lacking in judicial temperament. He showed marked partiality 
in at least one trial over which he presided, and regularly gave grand 
juries partisan federalist charges on current events. For this the House 
of Representatives, at President Thomas Jefferson’s instigation, 
impeached him, and he was tried before the Senate in 1805. That body 
heard fifty witnesses over a course of ten full days. The Jeffersonian 
Republicans had more than a two-thirds majority in the body, and if 
they had voted as a block Chase would have been convicted and 
removed from office. Happily, they did not vote as a block. . . . The 
significance of the outcome of the Chase trial cannot be overstated—
Chase’s narrow escape from conviction in the Senate exemplified how 
close the development of an independent judiciary came to being 
stultified. Although the Republicans had expounded grandiose theories 
about impeachment being a method by which the judiciary could be 
brought into line with prevailing political views, the case against Chase 
was tried on a basis of specific allegations of judicial misconduct. 
Nearly every act charged against him had been performed in the 
discharge of his judicial office. Instead it represented a judgment that 
impeachment should not be used to remove a judge for conduct in the 
exercise of his judicial duties. The political precedent set by Chase’s 
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Aside from the Feeney Amendment’s intrusion into judicial 
independence, the reporting provisions damage the protection 
afforded by downward departures against excessive sentences by 
potentially deterring judges from granting downward departures.306 
Individualized assessment is a key component of a fair criminal 
justice system because the process allows judges to review the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding a crime to prevent unjust 
consequences.307 Mandatory minimums have resulted in harsh 
sentences by limiting the ability of judges to exercise discretion 
and reduce sentences in appropriate circumstances.308 Moreover, 
                                                          
acquittal has governed that day to this: a judge’s judicial acts may not 
serve as a basis for impeachment. 
Id. 
306 David M. Zlotnick, The War within the War on Crime: The 
Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 
234 (2004) (discussing judicial reaction to the reporting provisions of the 
Feeney Amendment). For example, in a recent case, Judge Donald Molloy, of 
the District Court of Montana, wrote: 
I believe . . . that the Feeney Amendment, in seeking to strip federal 
judges of their judgment, will lead to more unjust sentences and that 
what we will end up with is a third branch of administrators heeding the 
beck and call of those who have sense of justice reflected in the old 
testament. 
Id. (quoting Sent. Tr. at 26, United States v. Chang Gou You, Cr. 02-15-H-
DWM (D. Mon. Sept. 11, 2003)). Judge Martin observed that “I certainly hope 
my former colleagues wouldn’t give in to that pressure, but look . . . judges 
don’t like to be reversed. Some judges are more concerned about their reversal 
rate than others. Some judges obviously are more concerned about the 
possibility of being reported.” How will Judicial Discretion Change under the 
Feeney Amendment?, supra note 158, at M12. 
307 149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5119 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy observed that “[i]t has been uniform and 
constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider 
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the 
human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the 
punishment to ensue.” Id. Judge Martin noted that “[f]or most of our history, our 
system of justice operated on the premise that justice in sentencing is best 
achieved by having a sentence imposed by a judge who, fully informed about 
the offense and the offender, has discretion to impose a sentence within the 
statutory limits.” Martin, supra note 247, at A31. 
308 U.S. v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022-23 (D.N.D. 2003). Judge 
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the impact of the reporting provisions of the Feeney Amendment is 
beginning to emerge in the federal courts. In the recent case of 
United States v. Kirsch, the court determined that the defendant’s 
case did not fall outside the heartland and denied a downward 
departure.309 The court added, however, that there was an 
additional reason why it refused to depart downward: 
The Court believes that the day of the downward departure 
is past. Congress and the Attorney General have instituted 
policies designed to intimidate and threaten judges into 
refusing to depart downward, and those policies are 
working. If the Court were to depart, the Assistant U.S. 
Attorney would be required to report that departure to the 
U.S. Attorney, who would in turn be required to report to 
the Attorney General. The Attorney General would then 
report the departure to Congress, and Congress could call 
the undersigned to testify and attempt to justify the 
departure. This reporting requirement system accomplishes 
its goal: the Court is intimidated, and the Court is scared to 
depart . . . . Our justice system depends on a fair and 
                                                          
Rodney S. Webb, appointed by President Reagan and a former federal 
prosecutor, of the District Court of North Dakota, wrote: 
[T]he Court submits that the pendulum for sentencing within the 
criminal justice system has moved too far to the right in favor of harsh 
sentences. We must adopt sentencing goals beyond retribution and 
deterrence. Our current system costs too much and we are in danger of 
losing a substantial portion of a whole generation of young men to 
drugs as their futures rot within our prisons. A society can be tough on 
crime without being vindictive, unjust or cruel . . . . Perhaps this 
opinion, as an appeal for a restoration of individualized sentencing, will 
provoke some thoughtful discussion on these important issues and help 
restore the traditional sentencing discretion of the district courts 
usurped by the legislative and executive branches of our government. 
Id. 
309 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006 (2003). The defendant was convicted of 
conspiracy to defraud the government and making false statements to a federal 
agency. Id. at 1006. The defendant requested a downward departure based on his 
contention that his case fell outside the “heartland” because of his “strong 
family, the history of employment, his strong community report, his education, 
and his amenability to probationary supervision.” Id. 
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impartial judiciary that is free from intimidation from the 
other branches of government. The departure reporting 
requirements constitute an unwarranted intimidation of the 
judiciary.310 
This type of reaction, though, is not uniform. Other judges have 
rejected the notion of a judicial “black list” to threaten and 
intimidate individual judges and affirm that the Feeney 
Amendment will have limited impact on criminal sentencing.311 
The opinion in United States v. Vanleer reflects this alternative 
perspective.312 The judge based his notion that the Feeney 
Amendment will have minimal substantive change on the ability of 
judges to downward depart on two areas.313 First, the idea of a 
judicial “black list” is erroneous because judicial departure 
decisions are already a matter of public record.314 The court stated 
that it was “not concerned about close scrutiny of its downward (or 
upward) departure decisions by Congress, the public, or 
otherwise.”315 Second, the Feeney Amendment in its final form 
only restricts the ability of judges to downward depart in child 
abduction and sex offense cases.316 The judge wrote that the 
Feeney Amendment makes “one limited change in the ability of 
district courts to depart downward in child abduction and sex 
offense cases . . . . [A] prominent journal circulated to defense 
attorneys seemingly suggested that the Feeney Amendment 
‘essentially eliminates judges’ discretion in all cases. This 
description is not accurate . . . .”317 In all other cases, judges retain 
their traditional ability to depart downward in appropriate 
circumstances.318 
This view, however, ignores that all downward departure 
decisions will be monitored by the Department of Justice and 
                                                          
310 Id. at 1006-07. 
311 See United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah 2003). 
312 Id. 
313 Id. at 1323-24. 
314 Id. at 1324. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at 1323. 
317 Vanleer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. 
318 Id. 
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Congress.319 This inevitably broadens the effect of the Feeney 
Amendment because individual judges may be less willing to 
depart for fear of reprisal.320 Additionally, the court in Vanleer 
deflected criticism of the Feeney Amendment by contending that 
the new system is substantially similar to the old.321 The individual 
reporting requirements that have concerned Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, however, are specific to the new system.322 The 
argument as to the degree of difference between the two systems is 
misplaced, however, given the addition of the monitoring 
provisions. It is the potential for abuse brought about the addition 
of the monitoring provisions that is problematic.323 Whatever may 
be the philosophy of one court, the judicial branch deserves 
protection in accordance with the historical and constitutional 
tradition of judicial independence.324 
                                                          
319 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)-(4) (2004). 
320 See United States v. Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (2003). In addition, 
Representative Conyers stated: 
Now my friends on the other side of the aisle will claim not to worry, 
that they fixed the Feeney Amendment which they will say is limited to 
sex offenses. But the truth is that the revised Feeney language would 
radically alter the sentencing regime for every single criminal case in 
the legal system. It does this by adding a whole host of new procedural 
requirements for a judge to show any form of mercy in all federal 
cases. The bill also adds new requirements on the Justice Department 
and the Sentencing Commission with regard to downward departures in 
all Federal cases. At the end of the day, what we will have is something 
very close to the original purpose of the Feeney Amendment-
mandatory minimums in all federal criminal cases. 
149 CONG. REC. H3059-02, 3075 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Conyers). 
321 VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1323-25. 
322 See supra text accompanying notes 276-278 for a description of the 
reporting provisions. 
323 How will Judicial Discretion Change under the Feeney Amendment?, 
supra note 158, at M12. Judge Martin noted that “[t]his was legislation which 
was put on as, in my view, just a total attack on judges. And with an attempt to 
intimidate.” Id. 
324 149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6713 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy noted: 
[T]he Feeney Amendment effectively created a “black list” of judges 
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C. The Feeney Amendment Overturns the Supreme Court 
Decision in Koon 
Two commentators have noted that the principle purpose of the 
Feeney Amendment was to overrule Koon.325 Koon implemented a 
deferential abuse of discretion standard, which recognized the 
“institutional advantage” of district judges to determine whether a 
case falls outside the “heartland” because they preside over many 
more Guidelines cases than appellate courts.326 The Feeney 
Amendment undermines the traditional sentencing discretion of 
trial judges, as articulated in Koon, to make factually driven 
sentencing decisions.327 It shifts sentencing discretion away from 
                                                          
that stray from the draconian mandates of the new law. The enacted 
amendment attempt [sic] to intimate [sic] the Federal judiciary by 
compiling a list of all judges who impose sentences that the Justice 
Department does not like. Again, this provision is not limited to crimes 
against children, but applies in any type of criminal case. It takes a 
sledge hammer to the concept of separation of powers. 
Id. 
325 Paul Shechtman & Nathaniel Z. Marmur, Retroactive Application of the 
PROTECT Act, N.Y. L.J., June 24, 2003, at col. 4. They cite Representatives 
Feeney’s statement that: 
[T]he Department of Justice believes that much of this damage is 
traceable to the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Koon versus the 
United States. In the Koon case, the court held that any factor not 
explicitly disapproved by the sentencing commission or by statute 
could serve as grounds for departure. So judges can make up 
exceptions as they go along. This has led to an accelerated rate of 
downward departures. 
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2422-23 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of 
Rep. Feeney). 
326 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). 
327 149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6711-12 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement 
of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy noted: 
[The Feeney Amendment] limits in several ways the ability of judges to 
depart downwards from the guidelines. It overturns a unanimous 1996 
Supreme Court decision, Koon v. United States, which established a 
deferential standard of review for departures from the guidelines based 
on the facts of the case-thereby undermining what the Court described 
as the “traditional sentencing discretion” of trial courts and the 
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district courts to appellate judges by changing the standard of 
review from “due deference” to de novo.328 Judge Jack B. 
Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New York, recently 
commented that “[f]or a judge to exercise what amounts to original 
power to sentence without actually seeing the person being 
sentenced is contrary to American tradition, as recognized in 
Koon.”329 Changing the standard of review to de novo further 
reduces the ability of judges to exercise discretion in the harsh 
criminal sentencing system.330 
Sentencing data supports the proposition that district judges are 
exposed to a significantly higher number of departure cases 
compared to appellate courts, and this undermines the DOJ’s 
justification for overturning Koon.331 The DOJ appealed only 19 
                                                          
“institutional advantage” of Federal district courts over appellate courts 
to make fact-based sentencing determinations. 
Id. Koon, 518 U.S. at 87. 
328 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2004). 
329 In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (order granting 
all sentencing hearings to be recorded by a video recording device). 
330 Id. Judge Weinstein noted: 
Passage of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (“PROTECT Act”) carries 
further the attenuation of the capacity of federal judges to do their work 
properly by requiring the Court of Appeals to review de novo a District 
Court’s departure from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. In 
effect, primary sentencing authority is shifted to the appellate judges 
whenever a trial court provides a lower sentence than do the Guidelines 
matrices. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
331 Koon, 518 U.S. at 98. In Koon, the Court noted: 
Before a departure is permitted, certain aspects of the case must be 
found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the 
Guideline. To resolve this question, the district court must make a 
refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the outcome, informed 
by its vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing. 
Whether a given factor is present to a degree not adequately considered 
by the Commission, or whether a discouraged factor nonetheless 
justifies departure because it is present in some unusual or exceptional 
way, are matters determined in large part by comparison with the facts 
of other Guidelines cases. 
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departure sentences in fiscal year 2001.332 Defendants appealed 
340 departure sentences, which represents only 4.5 percent of the 
total criminal sentences appealed in 2001.333 Furthermore, the DOJ 
explained that the Feeney Amendment would facilitate government 
appeal of “illegal” downward departures by requiring appellate 
courts to undertake a de novo review of the case.334 Senator 
Kennedy stated, however, that “in arguing for the abrogation of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Boon [sic] v. United States, the 
Department also failed to mention that it wins 78 percent of all 
sentencing appeals, or that 85 percent of all defendants who 
receive downward departures based on grounds other than 
cooperation with the government nevertheless receive prison 
time.”335 Of the 19 departure sentences appealed by the DOJ in 
fiscal year 2001, the departure decision was affirmed 21 percent of 
the time.336 The DOJ had a success rate of 79 percent, therefore, 
which fails to suggest that the abuse of discretion standard has 
hindered the DOJ in the appeals process.337 
Not only are district court judges required to preside over a 
significantly greater number of sentencing cases than appellate 
courts, but the nature of the sentencing process places district court 
judges in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence of 
an offender.338 In 2001, 96.6 percent of defendants accepted guilty 
pleas resulting in only 3.4 percent of cases reaching the trial 
                                                          
Id. 
332 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl. 58, at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm (last 
visited Mar.10, 2003). 
333 Id. at tbl. 57. 
334 Letter from Justice Department Supporting Original Feeney 
Amendment, 15 FED. SENT. R. 355 (Vera Inst. Just. June 2003) at 3, at 2003 WL 
22208851. 
335 149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6711 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy). 
336 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl. 58, at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm 
(last visited Mar.10, 2003). 
337 Id. 
338 In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 262-63 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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stage.339 The virtual removal of the federal criminal trial has 
shifted discretion away from judges and defense counsel to 
prosecutors, and placed significant emphasis on the sentencing 
hearing as the means to evaluate the offender and the facts of the 
case.340 A probation officer prepares a presentence report for every 
defendant in a criminal case.341 In addition to using the presentence 
report as a means of evaluating the defendant, district courts judges 
are able to personally assess and observe the defendant and 
interrogate the defendant and the defendant’s family members.342 
                                                          
339 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, fig. C, at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm 
(last visited Mar.10, 2003). 
340 U.S. v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 417-18 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002). Judge Weinstein noted: 
The virtual elimination of federal criminal trials, substituting 
administrative decisions not to prosecute or pleas of guilty, has 
substantially changed our federal criminal law system. Increased 
prosecutorial discretion and power have raised the percent of guilty 
pleas . . . . Discretion not to prosecute for the crime committed is 
widely exercised. Enhancement of control of sentencing by the 
prosecutor as a result of sentencing guidelines and minimum sentences 
has increased the government’s power to coerce defendants. There has 
been a change from the paradigmatic concept of investigation and 
accusation by the government of almost all persons believed to have 
committed crimes, trial by jury with a strong role for defense counsel, 
and discretion in sentencing by the court, to a system sharply reducing 
the role of defense counsel, the jury and the judge, and whatever 
protections they can afford a defendant. 
Id. Judge Weinstein noted further that “sentencing hearings routinely conducted 
following the entering of a guilty plea are the critical events in criminal 
prosecutions.” In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. at 262. 
341 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A). The presentence report includes, among 
other things, the defendant’s history and characteristics, including any prior 
criminal record and any circumstances affecting the defendant’s behavior that 
might be helpful in imposing a sentence. Id. at (d)(2)(A)-(F). 
342 In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. at 263. Judge Weinstein noted: 
Those attending a sentencing hearing typically include the defendant 
and defendant’s counsel, an Assistant United States Attorney, a 
probation officer (who prepared the presentence report), a court 
reporter, the judge, and the family, friends, employers, and other 
witnesses for the defendant and for the government. If the defendant is 
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Judge Weinstein explained: 
The sentencing hearing normally requires that the 
defendant be observed for credibility, mental astuteness, 
physical characteristics, ability to withstand the rigors and 
dangers of incarceration, and a myriad other relevant 
factors. In many instances, it is necessary to observe the 
employer’s and familial ties to the defendant. A judge 
applies mental impressions of many tangible and intangible 
factors when imposing a sentence. Many of these factors do 
not appear in the transcript. The defendant’s words, his 
facial expressions and body language, the severity of any 
infirmity, the depth of his family’s reliance, or the 
feebleness of his build cannot be accurately conveyed by a 
cold record. Many defendants are ill educated and 
inarticulate. They do not have the intellectual capacity to 
articulate, as might a great novelist, what is in their hearts. 
They are, after all, mere people.343 
The sentencing transcript and presentence report are unable, 
therefore, to properly encapsulate the district court judge’s 
impressions of the defendant, which means that this type of 
individualized assessment will be lost because “[i]t is unlikely that 
the Court of Appeals judges would elect to require a criminal 
defendant to appear in the appellate courtroom so its judges could 
in fact revisit the sentence de novo.”344 
The change of the standard of review results in the possibility 
                                                          
in custody, he or she is brought to court clad in prison garb, under the 
watchful eye of the United States Marshals. Otherwise, the defendant 
arrives in civilian attire. The closest family members are invited to sit 
with the defendant so that the court may observe them and interrogate 
them if necessary, and so that they and the defendant can furnish each 
other with emotional support. Given that the majority of defendants are 
charged with drug crimes, there is rarely a tangible “victim” in the 
court . . . . [D]efense counsel, the defendant, the prosecutor and the 
victim (if present) are given opportunities to speak . . . . The court then 
imposes a sentence “without unnecessary delay.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
343 Id. at 264 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
344 Id. 
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that defendants will receive excessive sentences because appellate 
courts lack the experience and opportunity to assess the defendant 
and the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s crime.345 For 
example, Dyck, a citizen of Canada, was a nineteen-year old with a 
fourth grade education who served a mitigated sentence of 12 
months for his minor role as “mule” in trafficking 85 pounds of 
marijuana into the United States.346 Following his release, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ordered him to 
permanently leave the United States and the defendant returned to 
Canada.347 Subsequently, the defendant paid a driver to take him to 
another part of Canada to visit friends.348 The driver decided to 
travel through the United States because of the better highway 
system but failed to inform the defendant of his plans.349 
Defendant fell asleep during the trip but awoke as the car 
approached the border.350 The border patrol officer stopped the 
vehicle and the defendant was charged with attempting to illegally 
reenter the country.351 The district court judge refused to impose 
the 41 to 51 month sentence, which reflected his criminal history 
category based on his prior drug trafficking offense, and sentenced 
Dyck to 6 months because his case fell outside the heartland as he 
was not attempting to reenter the United States to distribute 
drugs.352 The Government appealed and the Court of Appeals 
vacated the decision and mandated a sentence within the 41 to 51 
month range because it refused to consider Dyck’s minor role in 
the prior drug offense as a basis for downward departure.353 
                                                          
345 U.S. v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (D.N.D. 2003) (noting that 
the “district courts also enjoy familiarity with history of the case and reap the 
benefits of face-to-face contact with the defendants, their families, and their 
victims”). Id. 
346 Id. at 1017. 
347 Id. 
348 Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2003). 
349 Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-18. 
350 Id. at 1018. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2003). 
353 Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1020. The district court noted that the circuit 
court “fails to recognize the injustice of enhancing a defendant’s net offense 
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The Feeney Amendment deprives defendants, such as Dyck, of 
the wisdom and experience of district court judges. The district 
court judge in Dyck observed this fact upon remand of Dyck’s 
case: 
In the matter of the sentencing of Pedro Dyck, this Court 
enjoys the exact advantages over the appellate court the 
Supreme Court was referring to in Koon. The Court is 
located in an agricultural border state and regularly 
sentences defendants involved in immigration and drug 
crimes. The sentencing judge has over forty years 
experience in criminal law as a defense attorney, 
prosecutor, and judge; and as a judge, has sentenced 
hundreds of defendants under the direction of the 
Guidelines. The Court participated in all aspects of the case 
from pre-trial matters to trial to sentencing. The Court has 
met the defendant, conversed with the defendant, and 
peered into the whites of the defendant’s eyes. The district 
court is therefore in the better position to determine if this 
case falls outside the heartland of cases.354 
As noted by the district court judge in Dyck, the sentencing system 
should afford district court judges the deference they deserve 
because of their experience in evaluating the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of a crime: “The need [in punishment] 
is not for blindness, but for insight, for equity, for what Aristotle 
called ‘the correction of the law where it is defective owing to its 
universality.’ This can occur only in a judgment that takes account 
of the complexity of the individual case.”355 District court judges 
should be allowed to accomplish these goals. 
CONCLUSION 
Enactment of the Feeney Amendments does not reflect the 
                                                          
level for a prior offense, while failing to consider the role in the prior offense as 
a basis for departure.” Id. 
354 Id. 
355 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 79 (quoting COMPLETE WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE (Barnes ed., 1984), 1796). 
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legislative process at its best. Considering the devastating impact 
the original Feeney Amendment would have wrought on judicial 
sentencing discretion, it is remarkable that the House passed it 
based on a mere twenty minutes of debate. Although part of the 
reason for the enactment of the Feeney Amendment was due to 
concern over implementing the AMBER Plan on a nationwide 
scale, enactment of the Feeney Amendment reveals that the 
Judicial Branch requires protection from members of Congress and 
the Executive who fundamentally distrust judicial independence 
and discretion in sentencing or fail to appreciate the moral 
consequences of a sentencing system lacking the input of the 
judiciary. 
 
